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ARMY HIGH COMMAND

ORGANIZATION AND WORKING METHODS OF THE

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

By

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PREFACE

The following general description of the operations of the Intelligence Division of the German General Staff was written in 1947. At that time the authors did not have access to documentary material. The study was, therefore, based on the memory of the authors and on consultations with various other officers who had had G-2 experience at high level.

Chapters 1 and 2 were written by General Kurt von Tippelskirch, who was the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence of the German Army in 1941 and 1942. Chapter 3 was written by General Gerhard Matzky, who succeeded General Tippelskirch in 1942. Chapters 4, and 5 to 10 were prepared by Colonel Lothar Metz, the Chief of the Western Intelligence Branch from 1940 to 1944.

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Gerhard MATZKY
General der Infanterie a.D.
Date of Birth: 19 March 1894
Place of Birth: Kuestrin

Apart from the specifically military training received in army units and staffs, MATZKY has a profound educational background in various academic subjects. Thus, he has studied geodesy, history, philosophy, national economy and international law at various colleges and universities. In addition, he is one of the small number of German officers who underwent training at the Wehrmachtakademie, the German equivalent of the US National War College.

MATZKY joined the army in 1913, entering the 63d Infantry at Oppeln, Upper Silesia, as an officer candidate. In August 1913, he was promoted second lieutenant with rank dated August 1911. Throughout World War I he served on the Western and Eastern Fronts, first as a platoon leader and later as a company commander.

Remaining in the reduced army Germany was permitted to maintain after World War I, MATZKY was awarded General Staff Corps status in October 1936, by which time he had reached the rank of lieutenant colonel.

When World War II broke out, MATZKY, now a colonel, was serving in an assignment as military attache in Tokyo. He returned to Germany in December 1940 and a month later was assigned to Army Group D, in France, as Assistant Chief of Staff IV (Intelligence). While serving in this assignment, he was promoted Generalmajor in April 1941. Then, after two months in the Army High Command officer reserve, he was placed in command of the 21st Infantry Division in the northern sector of the Eastern Front. He remained on the Eastern Front until the end of the war and finally was in command of the XXVIII Corps during the severe battles in Eastern Prussia. He was promoted Generalleutnant in April 1943, while serving

as acting commander of the XXVIII Corps and General der Infanterie in September 1944, while in command of the XLVI Corps.

On 23 May 1945, the general was taken prisoner by British forces at Muerwik, near Flensburg in Holstein.

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Lothar METZ
Oberst a.D.
Date of Birth: 30 April 1908
Place of Birth: Wuerzburg

METZ joined the Army as an officer candidate in 1936 and was granted officer rank as a second lieutenant of artillery in 1930. When World War II broke out, he was in Berlin, where he was receiving General Staff training at the Kriegsakademie, the German equivalent of the US Command and General Staff School.

After participation in the Polish Campaign as supply and administration officer of the 20th Motorized Infantry Division, he was awarded General Staff Corps status in April 1940 and in December of the same year was promoted major. From March 1940 to April 1944 he served in various assignments, finally as operations officer, in the Western Intelligence Branch.

In April 1944, METZ was assigned as operations officer to the 44th Infantry Division, in Italy, and in December of the same year was transferred with that division to Hungary. On 1 May 1944 he was promoted colonel. A week later, on 7 May, he was taken prisoner by US forces at Salzburg, Austria.

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Kurt von TIPPELSKIRCH
General der Infanterie a.D.
Date of Birth: 9 October 1891
Place of Birth: Berlin

Educated at the Cadet Institute, Potsdam from 1902-06 and at the Central Cadet Depot, Berlin-Groszlichterfelde from 1906-10, Kurt von TIPPELSKIRCH was assigned as a lieutenant of infantry in 1909. After serving throughout World War I, toward the end of which he was promoted captain, he remained in the reduced army Germany was allowed to maintain at the end of that war and in 1927 was awarded General Staff Corps status following the usual training.

Between the two world wars von TIPPELSKIRCH held assignments as a General Staff officer with troops from 1926-29, specialist in the Foreign Military Intelligence Branch of the Army General Staff from 1929-33, battalion and later regimental commander from 1933-36 and as chief of the Foreign Military Intelligence Branch from 1936-38.

When World War II broke out, von TIPPELSKIRCH was serving an assignment as Army Chief Intelligence Officer, having been appointed to this post and promoted Generalmajor in 1938. During the war, he commanded the 30th Division in the central sector of the East Front in 1942-43 and then was attached to headquarters of the Eighth Italian Army, also in Russia. In 1944-45 the general, promoted Generalmajor in 1940 and General der Infanterie in 1942, served brief assignments in Italy as acting commander of the Fourth, then of the First and finally of the Fourteenth Army and was then transferred to Mecklenburg as acting commander of the Fourth Army. On 3 May 1945, he was taken prisoner at Ludwigslust, Mecklenburg.

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PART ONE

PEACETIME AND THE EARLY WAR YEARS

CHAPTER 1

ORIGIN AND PEACETIME DUTIES OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF IV

I. ORIGIN

By 1938 all intelligence work in the General Staff that had to do with foreign armies had been centralized under the Assistant Chief of Staff IV, (formerly 3d Section of the Army General Staff), whose duties Generaloberst Beck summarized in 1936 by saying: "I want you to tell me what the enemy is doing."

Contrary to the practice in other countries, the Assistant Chief of Staff IV and his subordinates were only evaluating agencies. While the Deuxieme Bureau of the French General Staff and the corresponding offices in England, Poland, Italy and other countries handled the procurement (espionage) and the evaluation of secret information as well as counter-espionage, in Germany both espionage and counterespionage were handled by the Counterintelligence Branch (Abwehr), later expanded to form the Counterintelligence Group, in the War Ministry of the Reich. Counter-intelligence was not under the supervision of the Chief of the Army General Staff, but under the Wehrmacht High Command (Chart A). The

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THE GERMAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE



Chart A

decisive reason for this was the intention, going back to the days of the 100,000-man Army, to save money and personnel by combining this work for the Army and the Navy under the Minister of the Reichswehr. Later, internal reasons connected with personnel problems led to this condition remaining unchanged.

The evaluating branches always felt that this system of organization rendered their work more difficult. They were the requesting agencies interested in the results, but had no immediate influence on the intelligence collecting mechanism. Very close cooperation with the Counterintelligence Branch and its functionaries, including the intelligence and security officers of each Wehrkreis *, whose task was to employ and dispatch secret agents, did not completely outbalance the disadvantages of the system, since it depended too much on personal contacts. Chart 1 shows the complications of this procedure.

II. THE ORGANIZATION OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF IV

In accordance with his mission of handling all problems connected with foreign armies, the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff IV was organized as shown in Chart B.

Initially, the division into two branches was due to purely organizational reasons; operating as one branch (until 1938 the 3d Branch), the organization had become hard to manage with its steadily growing number of personnel. Moreover, after General Halder reestablished the Assistant Chiefs of Staff the division corresponded to the arrangement of the old

* The basic military areas of Germany, in many respects similar to the pre-war corps areas in the USA. (Reviewer)

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Chart 2

ORGANIZATIONAL CHART



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Prussian General Staff. It relieved the Chief of the Army General Staff in his work and corresponded to the principle that in a sound organization nobody should have more than four to five functionaries under his immediate supervision. At the same time it made possible the employment of a number of generals in the Army General Staff, where they could be trained for special missions they were to perform in time of war, thus developing key personnel who, relieved of the daily routine, could devote themselves to major tasks. In the hands of these men was also a good part of the strategic and tactical training of the General Staff officers, to whom the Army General Staff had always tried to give training assignments aside from their specialized work.

The division of the field of activity into East and West had been done to meet the exigencies of a possible two-front war, which Germany always had to be prepared to meet because of its geographic location. Hence, the emphasis in the work of the 3d Branch (West) lay on the western countries, that of the 12th Branch (East) on the eastern neighbors of Germany. The other countries were distributed according to their military-political situation. In this respect some of them could have been handled by either branch. Purely technical consideration then were decisive for their distribution, namely, the effort to distribute the work load equally between both branches. Thus, it would be wrong to assume that exclusively military-political considerations decided the grouping of the countries in either branch. In the course of time some countries were even transferred repeatedly from the Eastern to the Western Branch and vice versa if a change seemed appropriate for practical reasons.

Within this organization, the task of the Assistant Chief of Staff IV was to see that all evaluation was done according to uniform standards, to eliminate overlapping, to handle problems exceeding the competence of the individual branches, to summarize the findings of the branches and to bring them to the knowledge of his superiors (the Chief of the Army General Staff and the Commander in Chief of the Army) and of other interested offices (chiefly the Assistant Chief of Staff I - Operations - and the Chief of the Operations Branch) in verbal or written reports. With the latter two agencies the Assistant Chief of Staff IV had to maintain very close contact. They received from him and his branches enemy intelligence for staff exercises and map maneuvers as well as for mobilization orders and he had to keep them informed on all important military and political developments.

III. THE 3d AND 12th BRANCH (WESTERN AND EASTERN INTELLIGENCE BRANCHES)

1. Organization. Fundamentally, the work procedure of both branches was identical, so that it is not necessary to treat them separately. Their organization is shown in Charts C and D. The personnel employed in the section for each country shows the degree of importance given to the individual countries, from a military point of view, in their relationship to Germany.

2. Working Methods. The ideal of the Army General Staff was to know the exact strength and organization of all foreign armies as well as the strategic intentions and all other factors decisive for warfare concerning those countries with which a war was possible. This goal was approached

ORGANIZATIONAL CHART

BRANCH 3 (WESTERN INTELLIGENCE BRANCH)

Branch Chief (GSC officer)
with Section I (Policy Section) 1 officer

Section II *	Section III *	Section IV *	Section V *
Intelligence on France Spain Portugal	Intelligence on Great Britain and Empire USA Japan Central America South America	Intelligence on Italy	Intelligence on Belgium Holland Luxembourg Switzerland
Personnel: 3 GSC and 3 other officers	Personnel: 1 GSC and 2 other officers	Personnel: 1 GSC and 1 other officer	Personnel: 1 GSC and 2 other officers

* Referred to as country-groups or country-sections.

Chart C

ORGANIZATIONAL CHART

BRANCH 12 (EASTERN INTELLIGENCE BRANCH)

Branch Chief
(GSC officer)

Section I *	Section II *	Section III *
Intelligence on Balkan States Hungary	Intelligence on Russia Sweden Norway Denmark Turkey Finland	Intelligence on Poland Estonia Latvia Lithuania
Personnel: 1 GSC and 2 other officers	Personnel: 2 GSC and 3 other officers	Personnel: 2 GSC and 2 other officers

* Referred to as country-groups or country-sections.

to a considerable extent.

The basis for every mobilization is the peacetime army. Hence, by knowing the organization of a peacetime army the far more difficult estimate of the mobilized wartime army could be constructed. For each country, all information obtained which was of interest from a military point of view, particularly all information on its peacetime army, was recorded in the "Orientation Logbook." Thus an orientation logbook had to exist for every country that was worked on by the branches. The size of this logbook depended on the military significance of the particular country with regard to Germany. In the case of the most important countries it treated all details. The findings on each mobilized wartime army were summed up in the "Wartime Military Potential Estimate."

3. Intelligence Sources. The following sources of information were available *:

a. Official publications of every kind. From them a fairly comprehensive picture of the strength and the organization of a nation's peacetime army could be gained. Seniority lists, publications of promotions and transfers, and the "regulation sheets of the war ministries" were of particular importance.

A good means to countercheck and supplement the work was offered by the annually published Annuaire Militaire of the League of Nations, while the reports published annually by the chairman of the French parliamentary committee for military matters in preparation for the debates on the army

* Only a few obviously essential features for the importance of the various sources will be given in the following enumeration.

budget, and these debates themselves, were very informative for the evaluation of the French army.

b. Military literature. Aside from statistical data, the most important information that could be gained from professional literature was that relating to the further development of the army (for example, the problem of motorization and the use of tanks). But certain other important problems were also very clearly revealed. Thus, the dispute on the size and training of the French reserves, which lasted for almost two decades and occupied a large place in French military literature, furnished a fairly accurate idea of the combat value of the French reserve units. This value was not great, as was shown by the collapse of these units on the Meuse river between Sedan and Givet in 1940, but had often been overestimated by friends and enemies and had contributed materially to an overrating of French military power.

c. Press, Radio, and Motion Pictures. It was important to study these with regard to special items, for example reports in local newspapers on movements of units and on military events. The careful surveillance of Russian newspapers, which were hard to procure, was almost the only source of information on the organization of the Russian peacetime army. While the Russians were extremely logical in their unsurpassed security system (among other things the Russian units did not wear any regimental insignia, even in peacetime), this system was undermined by the press, apparently for propaganda reasons (stressing the performances of individuals and whole units). Furthermore, press photography and motion picture performances again and again produced details which were valuable

for putting together a composite picture of Russian organization and equipment.

d. Signal Intercept Service. This was handled by an office of the counterintelligence organization. The extensive peacetime radio communications of a military command in administrative and technical matters, as well as radio traffic for training purposes within the frame of military maneuvers, gave important clues to the peacetime organization.

e. Military Attaches. The significance of the military attaches for the perfection of statistics on a peacetime army need not be explained in detail. The attaches also were in the best position to judge the quality of an army and they were the most authoritative sources for evaluating the probable high commanders in foreign armies. Very many individual questions could be answered most quickly and simply through an exchange of ideas with them.

f. Duty with Foreign Armies. The activities of the military attaches were supplemented by travel abroad and by the attachment of officers to foreign armies. Journeys to foreign countries by the intelligence specialists for the various countries were chiefly for the purpose of obtaining a personal impression of the country that they were working on, of the mentality of its people and their customs and, furthermore, served to perfect their knowledge of the language. These journeys were an indispensable and valuable indirect means for comprehending a foreign army. Espionage activities were positively forbidden to such officers. The attachment of officers to foreign armies was generally on the basis of mutual exchange and their primary purpose was to cultivate fellowship

and thus promote international understanding, which the German General Staff constantly strove to attain despite widespread opinions to the contrary. This purpose is strongly indicated by the fact that officers were only detailed to countries which were friendly to Germany, or at least not overtly inimical to her. The attachments also provided a valuable insight into the organization and training of the armies concerned.

g. Counterintelligence *. All of the above-mentioned published sources and information could be obtained by overt means, but they did not exceed that which the respective foreign country was unable or unwilling to keep secret. With the exception of Russia, and to a certain extent Poland, the activities concerned took place in public. This was due largely to the realization that the maintenance of secrecy (in the case of regulations, for instance,) is accompanied by the disadvantage that what is to be kept secret from unauthorized persons may also remain unknown to those who should be informed. For example, the fear of losing a secret directive makes its safekeeping seem more important to the person responsible than the circulation of its contents. Even the very principle of maintaining secrecy has its disadvantages. The fact that the secrecy system was raised to an absurdity in the well-known Hitler Directive # 1: "Everyone may know only what concerns him," deserves only incidental mention.

Nevertheless, there are many subjects on which perfect security for one's own army is just as necessary as complete intelligence coverage on

* See Chapter 1, I.

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a foreign army that one intends to evaluate. All the armies of the world employ secret intelligence communication systems to handle such material. From the military point of view, the important subjects lie in the field of mobilization, the strength of the wartime armed forces and their operational intentions, and in the extensive field of the war potential of a country, which is very important from the viewpoint of military economy. Apart from occasional slips and indiscretions by important personalities or by the press, all information of this type can be obtained only by way of intelligence activity.

Cooperation with the Counterintelligence Service was based on the following principles: The counterintelligence people knew what was wanted, namely, information on all that was being kept secret, and therefore made available all such information reaching them.

In order to direct activities toward certain pressing questions, consultations between the Counterintelligence Service and the Army research specialists interested in the material took place frequently. In addition, each country-group of the intelligence branches periodically submitted questionnaires to the Counterintelligence Service listing all problems of particular interest at the time. In every case judgment was passed on the material as to its value, the Counterintelligence Service giving information on the quality and credibility of its sources.

Owing to its widely ramified intelligence network, a counterintelligence service also produces, as what might be called a by-product, much material that is not secret but can be procured only with difficulty in any other way. Such material comes especially from local newspapers,

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which frequently contain important military details, and from other printed material of all types.

h. Political Crises. Beginning with 1935, periodically occurring political crises, many of which brought about a more or less complete mobilization and in some cases even the beginning of troop assemblies, gained a particular intelligence significance. They permitted a check on existing intelligence data and an opportunity to supplement them, as well as to obtain knowledge on possible enemy strategic intentions. In this respect, surveillance of the French military system was particularly revealing. So far as France was concerned, German intelligence succeeded right up to 1939 in recognizing all details of the first five days of each mobilization and the beginning of the troop assembly, and in drawing valuable conclusions as to the French operations that would follow.

i. Collaboration with the Foreign Office. It was international usage to employ for military intelligence purposes the installations, particularly the consulates, maintained in foreign countries by the foreign offices. A few countries carried this practice so far that they employed undercover officers in the consular service, a procedure which was quite fertile insofar as military matters were concerned. The German Foreign Office was extremely reserved toward this practice, if not completely forbidding it. In spite of frequent attempts, no arrangement could be made for the Office to officially direct its representatives abroad to participate in intelligence work. Hence, the only possible course for the intelligence service was to attempt to close these intelligence gaps by influencing the mission chiefs through the military attaches or by

forming direct contacts with the consuls. The degree of success attained therefore depended on the personal tact of the military attache concerned. The Counterintelligence Service made efforts in the same direction.

Germany maintained only a few consulates in the Soviet Union and collaboration with them was of decisive importance. It was therefore a heavy blow for the military intelligence service when the number of consulates was constantly decreased under Russian pressure during the last years before 1939 owing to the increasing frigidity of relations between Germany and the Soviet Union. This closed one of the few sources of intelligence on Russia.

Consciously or subconsciously, the Foreign Office seems to have been influenced by the Dreyfus Affair in its attitude toward military matters. This episode not only brought the German Military Attache in Paris into an insoluble conflict between duty and inclination at that time, but for a whole decade placed the Foreign Office in the awkward position of having to fabricate far too obvious excuses instead of telling the truth. Furthermore, memories of the direct reports to the Kaiser by military attaches during the Imperial Era, which reports had been very inconvenient for the Foreign Office at that time, later caused the Foreign Office to prevent any political reporting and political activities of any kind by the military attaches.

The Foreign Office and the Army General Staff were united in their fundamental aversion to any espionage activities. Being necessarily connected with doubtful sources, such activities were contrary to the traditional education of the officer corps.

4. The Orientation Lookout. Information on the following items was

entered in the Orientation Logbook:

Brief military-geographic summary (with statistical data on population strengths and structure as to age classes).
Form of government and constitution.
Constitutional position of the army.
Military legislation (length of compulsory service, draft law, recruiting procedure, reserve training, etc.).
Military budget.
Organization, garrisons and strength of the peacetime army (mother country and colonies).
Officer appointments.
The individual arms and services, their organization, strength, equipment and arms.
Training and other regulations.
Tank development.
Chemical warfare.
Air warfare.
Home defense.
Personnel and materiel mobilization.
Industrial capacity.
Economic and food situation.
Navy and Air Force (brief statements contributed by the respective intelligence departments of the Navy and the Luftwaffe).
As a final summary, a brief evaluation of the peacetime army.

The purpose was to collect everything of importance on the military potential of a country. This work was of a purely statistical nature in the case of most of the armies concerned and offered no difficulties because of the abundance of available material. The extent and thoroughness of the work depended on the number of researchers employed and their working capacity; the number of researchers also reflected the importance of the country from the German military point of view.

The Soviet Union was the only country that presented any essential difficulties for the reasons already stated. A former General Staff officer of the old Prussian Staff, who was familiar with the Russian character and language, succeeded through painstakingly thorough work in compiling a fairly accurate picture of the Russian peacetime army.

It was still more difficult to obtain even an approximate picture of the capacity of the Russian war economy. Russian publications served propaganda purposes exclusively (for example, data on the production of arms was given only in percentages over previous years: 300 percent more tanks, etc.) and thus tended to obscure rather than clarify the picture. This effect was intensified by our underrating the Russian economic and organizational capacity, which was chiefly the fault of German industrialists, since they had been the only ones who had been able to gain even a limited insight into Russian conditions until 1933. It was a part of the Russian art of dissemblance to pretend to be incompetent and backward, in order to gain as much as possible.

The states with a military constitution based on the militia system, the prototype of which is Switzerland, were in a special category. Owing to the nature of the militia system there is no structural difference between the peacetime army and the wartime army in Switzerland. The various units of the wartime army are called together periodically for training in peacetime, so that there are no military secrets in Switzerland apart from information on the national fortifications and the military-economic potential.

5. The Wartime Military Potential Estimate. The evaluations of the countries which were important for Germany had to give as complete information as possible on the following points:

Military-political situation and probable enemies.
Strength and organization of the mobilized armies, particularly the number and value of the reserve units to be formed.
System and speed of mobilization.
Assembly and strategic possibilities.

Home defense installations and their probable combat value.
Data on armament, equipment, ammunition stocks.
Strength, organization and capacity of navy and airforce (brief informative summary supplied by the Naval and Air Intelligence respectively).
A list of the probable high commanders (background, ability) was attached.

The results of this system were approximately the following:

France. The strength and organization of the mobilized army did not produce any surprise. The course of the mobilization was known to its last details. The first five mobilization days followed the pattern that had become known during the periods of diplomatic tension and had thus been recorded. Some details about a defensive assembly in Alsace were known.

Manifold public statements, French literature, and a study of the military history of France produced the opinion that if the French General Staff assumed the offensive at all it would do so very methodically. The Maginot Line was at least a psychologic tie which made defense come first. The French people shrank from making sacrifices in a second world war even nearly as heavy and bloody as in World War I, and probably did not feel biologically capable of replacing such losses.

On the basis of the one-sided experience gained in World War I, -- restricted chiefly to the conduct of battles of materiel -- and because of the dominating intent to prevent losses, an extremely cautious and methodical system of attack had evolved, which allowed no scope for daring initiative and therefore practically precluded the opportunity of taking an enemy by surprise. In French military literature and occasionally also during major troop maneuvers, tendencies to depart from this tactical

inflexibility could sometimes be observed -- especially in connection with the problem of the use of modern, rapidly moving motorized and armored forces -- but these ideas obviously had not been able to gain recognition (vain efforts of De Gaulle).

Thus, one could count on the French army starting its scheduled attack on the Siegfried Line only after having completed its assembly and after thorough preparations, which might take weeks; probably the arrival of strong English forces would also be awaited. On the basis of existing intelligence and in view of the mentality of the French General Staff, a surprise crossing of the Rhine and an offensive into Southern Germany was not to be expected.

Poland. The exact strength of the mobilized army was not known. The formation of about fifteen reserve divisions was expected. The available manpower potential would have made it possible to double the peacetime army of thirty divisions, but it was doubted whether arms and equipment were available for this force. This conclusion proved to be right, but up to the outbreak of war no information was obtained on the exact assembly points or on the identifying number of even a single reserve division. On the other hand, numerous reports were available on the activation of reserve units (regiments and infantry and artillery battalions), from which an approximate picture of the tactical grouping of the Polish army could be gained.

After the capture of Warsaw, the documents of the Polish General Staff revealed the reason for this intelligence gap. Motivated by an exaggerated attempt at secrecy, the Polish General Staff had ordered the

creation of reserve staffs and tactical units in the various military areas, but had kept secret the intended consolidation of these individual units into major units and had withheld the appropriate order until the last moment. Therefore, not only the German intelligence service failed, but also considerable friction occurred within the Polish mobilized forces themselves during the swift course of events after 1 September 1939.

On the whole, the secrecy regulations in the Polish army had been extremely strict -- considering the Slavic mentality. For example, a safe in the General Headquarters was allowed to be opened only by two officers jointly. Taking along secret documents for work at home was forbidden and, to enforce this regulation, the officers were checked daily when leaving the office building.

With regard to the strategic intentions of the Poles it had been expected that they planned an operation for the swift seizure of Eastern Prussia but otherwise intended to meet the German attacks by counter-attacks, expecting decisive success in the employment of strong cavalry masses pushing deep into the flanks of the advancing German armies. The capacity and in particular the hardiness of the Polish soldier were rated very highly, but by modern standards the training of the troops left much to be desired, while the weapons only partly met modern requirements. The Polish High Command lacked tradition and training and it was to be expected that the Polish army by no means would be a match for German units of equal strength.

Russia. The difficulties of obtaining a somewhat reliable picture of the strength and capacity of the mobilized Russian military forces were

very great. With regard to the peacetime army they have already been described. Espionage in the usual sense was utterly impossible in the Soviet Union. Aside from the suspiciously reserved Slavic mentality and the complete exclusion of Russian society from any contact with foreigners, this was prevented by the government-controlled economic system, which made it impossible to establish intelligence offices under the cover of harmless commercial activities of any kind. In other words, the Iron Curtain existed and was completely impenetrable even before 1939.

Thus, the only possible course was to construct an approximate picture of the possible strength and capacity of Russia's wartime forces on the basis of general experience and knowledge (population strength, strength and organization of the peacetime army) and occasional items of intelligence, mostly rather vague. However, it could not be said with certainty to what extent the Russian armament industry could produce the arms for a number of reserve units corresponding to the population of the Soviet Union. In accordance with the precepts of careful general staff work the respective researchers put their estimates at the highest theoretically possible level, not without being strongly doubted by other parties.

Another factor that should be mentioned was the widely held opinion -- which could not be checked by the General Staff -- that the Russians were hardly able to master even their peacetime transportation needs, so that a breakdown of the transportation system was to be expected under the far greater strain of war. The Soviets gladly allowed the circulation of such rumors and possibly even originated them. In this they undoubtedly were helped by the inherent Russian tendency toward self-criticism, a

trait which is very ably exploited by Soviet propaganda in directing public opinion and in the drive for higher performances.

On the whole, it cannot be denied that the evaluation of the Soviet Union was a groping in the dark in many ways. Thus, the Russians were very unjustly credited with no technical skill, even in industrial operations. The over-all picture was such that the last German military attache in Moscow, General Koestring, characterized it with the words: "The Russians are Asiatics, you will never understand them." The harmful inclination of the highest German authorities always to accept as true that which coincided with their own wishful thinking was bound to have a fatal effect in dealing with as secretive an enemy as Soviet Russia.

Italy. The Army General Staff had no delusions concerning the military capacity of Italy. In the summer of 1939, the 3d Branch (Western Intelligence Branch) prepared a memorandum on "The Limitations of the Military Potential of the Italian Empire," which candidly exposed Italy's weaknesses. This memorandum was distributed to the major command agencies but was confiscated and destroyed by order of Hitler, since he found it intolerable to make accessible to a large circle such an unfavorable judgment of an ally. A memorandum published in the spring of 1941 on the Italian wartime armed forces met with the same fate because it contained a disparaging comment on the "generalship" of Mussolini.

The weakness of the Italian armed forces was seen in its insufficient arms, its standard of training -- which was far below the European average, in the general lack of soldierly talents of the Italian people, and in the Italian armament industry, technically good in the details, but on the

whole of a small capacity. The industrial potentials of Italy and Germany were as one to ten.

The Italians are artists, therefore also good actors and stage directors. This found its expression in peacetime military performances which completely misled the layman. Numerous attachments of German officers to Italian troop units and to the Italian Military Academy (Scuola di Guerra) had given the German General Staff a deep insight into the actual strength of Italy, which was estimated as being very low.

No agreements of a strategic nature had been made with the Italian General Staff prior to 1 September 1939 for a possible joint conduct of war. The visit of the Commander in Chief to Rome in May 1939 had been more of a social contact, but remained superficial from a military point of view. Even by June 1940 no agreements were made. Thus it happened that the Italian army remained in its original defensive posture until the day of Italy's entry into the war, when it had to be regrouped over a period of several days for offensive action. The Italian conduct caused the French General Huntziger to make the following cynical remark during the negotiations in Compiègne:

"Les Italiens nous ont déclaré la guerre, mais ils ne nous ont pas fait la guerre. Il ne faut pas conclure d'armistice avec eux. L'armistice existe du moment de la déclaration de la guerre." *

As to the other European countries which were of military consequence for Germany, sufficient intelligence was available on their military

* The Italians have declared war on us but they are not actually at war with us. No armistice should be concluded with them. The armistice existed at the moment of the declaration of war.

capacities. On Belgium and Holland it was particularly complete and just as little doubt existed as to the forces available to England at the beginning of the war.

6. Tactics and Training in Foreign Armies. These subjects were studied in order to gain a picture of the command structure and the combat value of the foreign armies. The knowledge obtained in this respect was recorded in the Orientation Logbook and in the Wartime Military Potential Estimate. In addition, the study of foreign tactics was important for checking German ideas and for the training of staffs. This was particularly true of the ideas on the organization and command of motorized and armored forces, which were only in the stage of development. Hence, urgent interest in directives and military literature treating these questions existed in the offices of the Army High Command as well as in the field army. Cooperation was very close with other General Staff agencies in this field. It was particularly close with the office of the Assistant Chief of Staff I and with Branch I (Operations) -- both of which handled the operational possibilities of foreign armies and the training of the General Staff and potential General Staff officers -- but also with the field forces through the 4th and 11th Branches under the Assistant Chief of Staff II, which handled organization in the field, military schools and officer training.

The train of thought of possible enemies was of operational interest. For this reason, information from the Assistant Chief of Staff IV was frequently used during General Staff exercises to place the initial situation of the enemy side as closely as possible in conformance with

actual conditions.

The Assistant Chief of Staff II saw to it that methods of operation, tactical principles peculiar to foreign armies which varied from German doctrine (for example, the French system of attack) and unusual tables of organization of foreign army units (such as modern motorized and armored forces) were treated practically during training exercises as well as in the training at the Kriegsakademie *. The material for this purpose was furnished by the branches under the Assistant Chief of Staff IV. It consisted of:

Foreign army regulations.
Tactical problems.
Articles in newspapers and periodicals.
Military books.
Reports on maneuvers (from the press, military attaches, or military observers).

The disputes in France on the use of swift mobile units were quite informative, but produced no practical results insofar as the French themselves were concerned. In Russia the use of tanks and infantry in coordinated action and the employment of airborne troops on a strategic scale were observed; a Russian troop maneuver occupied with the latter technique, the course of which became known down to small details, very much stimulated German study of this problem. In this connection it should be mentioned that the Russian General Staff, like the Soviet Union in general, was bent on all innovations, no matter which field may have been involved. From the outside it appeared to be almost a mania to be as modern as possible. The revolutionary temper, averse to and untrammeled

* The German equivalent of the US Command and General Staff School.

by tradition, found expression in this tendency.

The results of all the studies described above, which had to be confined to the leading continental military powers (France, Russia, Italy and Poland) * because of the inadequate number of personnel, found expression in army publications of various types, such as the "Maneuver Reports" published annually by the 3d and 12th Branches of the Army General Staff. Furthermore, all important foreign directives were translated from the original text and published in book form; special problems were treated in memoranda; all articles from foreign military literature that seemed important were translated and sent to all offices having an interest in them.

7. Cooperation with Other Staff Divisions. Aside from the offices under the Assistant Chief of Staff IV there were a few staff sections which had to occupy themselves with reports on the installations of foreign armies, notably the 10th (Fortifications) Branch and the Ordnance Office. In addition, other staff sections were inclined to employ intelligence researchers for special features of foreign armies that were of interest to them (for example, motorization and army communications). These efforts were natural and useful, but duplication of effort had to be avoided. Inasmuch as the Counterintelligence Office was usually the procuring agency, it was possible to prevent requests for information from by-passing the Assistant Chief of Staff IV and his staff. All inquiries had to go through him and he could often help the technical staff section without troubling

* With regard to motorization, England and the USA were also covered.

the Counterintelligence Office. An essential task of the staff under the Assistant Chief of Staff IV was to fulfill the intelligence requirements of the staff sections of the Army High Command in all fields concerning foreign armies.

The 10th Branch carried out research on both German and foreign fortifications. The staff under the Assistant Chief of Staff IV was not happy about this solution, but overlapping could not be avoided. For example, the Maginot Line was a part of the French Army organization which could not possibly be considered separately and which had its own fortification troops, research on which remained a matter for the Western Intelligence Branch. Similar difficulties had appeared prior to the autumn of 1938 in research on the Czechoslovak fortifications and later on those of Poland. The 10th Branch was dissolved in the summer of 1939, partly because of this situation.

That the study of the weapons of foreign armies was a matter for the Army Ordnance Office was clear. The subject required technical knowledge, which the researchers of the Western and Eastern Intelligence Branches did not have, and the primary interest in new developments of foreign weapons was with the Army Ordnance Office. Close cooperation with that office insured that the interests of the General Staff were protected.

The same can be said of the very extensive reporting on the war economy of foreign countries, which subject was handled by the Economic and Armaments Office (WiRue) at the Wehrmacht High Command.

8. Cooperation with the Navy and Luftwaffe. Very close contacts existed with the corresponding staff sections of the Navy and the

Luftwaffe. Contacts were naturally closer in the case of the Luftwaffe than of the Navy, because of the more frequent cases of coordinated Army - Air Force action and because of the overlapping organization of the ground and air forces in some foreign armies. Furthermore, the hasty establishment of the corresponding staff sections in the Luftwaffe made itself felt up to 1939, so that it seemed appropriate to have the opinions reached by these sections checked by officers of the 3d and 12th Branches of Army Intelligence, which had handled foreign air forces before the enlargement of the Army.

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CHAPTER 2

DUTIES IN WARTIME

I. THE ORGANIZATION OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF IV

1. 1939 and 1940. With the outbreak of war the Assistant Chief of Staff IV, the forward echelons of the Western Intelligence Branch (until that date 3d Branch) and the Eastern Intelligence Branch (formerly 12th Branch) were moved to Zossen as part of the Army High Command. The rear echelons of the two branches and the Attache Branch remained in Berlin. The wartime organization of the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff IV is shown in Chart E.

The reasons for this division were the lack of space as well as the desire to keep the command staff of the Army High Command as small as possible. In addition, it was easier with this separation to protect the Chief of the Army General Staff and the Assistant Chief of Staff IV against inconvenient visits. Therefore, only those parts of the branches were taken along which were immediately necessary in the conduct of operations -- chiefly the general staff officers and a few particularly important experts on those countries with which there was, or threatened to be, a state of war. All experts on other countries and researchers on statistical matters whose work did not have to be on hand at all times remained in Berlin.

The Attache Branch remained in Berlin in order to maintain close contact with the accredited foreign attaches in Berlin. This arrangement

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ORGANIZATIONAL CHART

Asst Chief of Staff IV
(Intelligence)
with adjutant (GSC officer)

Location	West.Int.Br.	East.Int.Br.	Attache Branch	Branch for Army Matters	Representative of Foreign Office
Zossen Hq Army High Command	1st Echelon	1st Echelon		Entire Branch	attached to Chief of Staff IV
Base headquarters, Berlin	2d Echelon	2d Echelon	Entire Branch		

Chart I

was maintained for the Attache Branch throughout the entire war with only a short interruption in the summer of 1942. The importance of the second echelon had been small from the very beginning. It decreased further as the number of Germany's enemies increased so that further researchers were needed in the first echelon.

2. Origin of the "Branch for Army Matters." Even in peacetime there had been definite disadvantages in the fact that only part of the work of the intelligence offices of various headquarters, namely, intelligence on foreign armies, was combined under the Assistant Chief of Staff IV as the Army's highest ranking intelligence officer. In peacetime only the intelligence officers of those Wehrkreise that faced on Germany's frontiers were occupied with intelligence concerning foreign armies, insofar as they had been included in the counterintelligence machinery. In this capacity, however, they were under the supervision of the Counterintelligence Office, Wehrmacht High Command, for reasons already stated.

In peacetime, the Army High Command was also excluded from almost all other fields of intelligence activity, especially internal political matters, which were the responsibility of the Reichswehr * Minister (later Reich War Minister) with his appropriate branch of the Wehrmacht High Command (originating in the Schleicher era). This had disadvantages even then.

During the war, when the army became many times larger, so that millions of men were removed from the immediate influence of the National

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* Reichswehr: The small military force of 100,000, which Germany was permitted to maintain in terms of the Treaty of Versailles after World War I. (Reviewer)

Socialist Party, the Party tried to retain and strengthen its influence by devious means, and even to extend it into the Army itself. It instructed its lower offices to maintain very close contact with the drafted soldiers, especially with Party members. It explained this procedure by saying that it had to maintain its protecting influence over these men and that its task was to insure that the spirit of National Socialism was kept alive and furthered in the mobilized reserve units so that irregularities which otherwise might remain concealed could become known. Therefore, complaints addressed directly to the Party and by-passing the regular channels were not to be punishable as prescribed by the regulations, and even anonymous denunciations were to be investigated and the culprits punished if found guilty. Hitherto, such denunciations were brought to the knowledge of the superior officer concerned but were never investigated.

The appearance of the Party in occupied Poland also very soon led to tension and to sharp clashes not only with local commanders, but even between the Army High Command and the Wehrmacht High Command.

According to former usage, the Wehrmacht High Command was to arbitrate in disputes with the Party. The Party, however, found in the Wehrmacht High Command a leniency in many respects exceeding what the Commander in Chief of the Army was able to approve of in the interest of maintaining military discipline. The Army Commander in Chief therefore considered it necessary to establish an organization in the Army High Command itself to intervene in such cases and also to represent the Army directly in negotiations with the Party. Moreover, there was a need for central supervision over the influence exerted on the troops by the Propaganda Ministry through

its propaganda companies and the Press Branch of the Wehrmacht High Command.

All these considerations led to the formation of the "Branch for Army Matters." Since it was occupied with affairs which were a part of intelligence activity in higher command agencies, it was placed under the supervision of the Assistant Chief of Staff IV, who was also the intelligence officer of the Army General Staff. The Liaison Section of the Counter-intelligence Group of the Wehrmacht High Command had been placed under the Assistant Chief of Staff IV in accordance with the mobilization plan and this section now was merged with the new branch. The Liaison Section was occupied exclusively with matters of counterespionage and with security in the troop units.

Aside from routine work, two particularly important matters were handled by the newly established branch in the winter of 1939-40:

a. A command was issued to the troops which confirmed that Army personnel were forbidden to by-pass their command headquarters and appeal directly to Party officials in military matters. This regulation, which was published without consulting the Party, seriously annoyed the Deputy of the Fuehrer, Rudolf Hess, and led to ill feelings between him and the Commander in Chief of the Army which were not removed before Hess' flight to England in 1941.

b. A decree had been issued by the Reich Leader of the SS to the SS troops before the western campaign, in which he declared that it was their duty to the Fatherland to leave children behind for Germany. The wording of this decree was at least ambiguous and led to an extremely strong reaction by the Army, which read from it an invitation to the SS

not even to desist from adultery with the wives of Army men or from free love with their daughters. On pressure by the Commander in Chief of the Army, Hitler felt obliged to publish a rather lame explanation of the original decree. This explanation was published to the Army by the Commander in Chief of the Army as a regulation with his opinion on its meaning.

With the setting up of the Branch for Army Matters, a centralized control was established over all fields of military intelligence, with the exception of counterintelligence. This organization continued through the winter of 1939-40.

Changes of location caused by the war situation in the West are shown in Chart F.

II. WORKING METHODS OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF IV AND HIS STAFF SECTIONS

With the beginning of the war, the collection and evaluation of information on the enemy became the most important intelligence activity. Thereafter, the chiefs of the Western and Eastern Branches reported twice daily, in the morning and in the evening, to the Assistant Chief of Staff IV on the enemy situation. He in turn took part in the daily joint situation report to the Chief of the Army General Staff and later in the day to the Commander in Chief of the Army. The branch chiefs concerned were brought to these conferences if necessary. In periods of particular tension at the front, the Assistant Chief of Staff IV was informed continuously by the branch chiefs on changes in the enemy situation. Important messages were immediately reported personally or by telephone

GERMAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

Location Chart

Period	Branches	Location
Pre-war	All Branches	Berlin
Sep 39 - 9 May 40	Chief of Staff IV 1st Echelon, West.Int.Br. 1st Echelon, East.Int.Br. Branch for Army Matters	Zossen
9 May - 1 Jun 40	Chief of Staff IV 1st Echelon, West.Int.Br. Branch for Army Matters	Muenstereifel
1 Jun - 1 Jul 40	as above	Forges, South.Belgium
9 May - 1 Jul 40	1st Echelon, East.Int.Br.	Giessen
1 Jul - 1 Nov 40	Chief of Staff IV 1st Echelon, West.Int.Br. 1st Echelon, East.Int.Br. Branch for Army Matters	Fontainebleau
1 Nov - end of war	as above	Zossen

Note: 2d Echelon, West.Int.Br.)
2d Echelon, East.Int.Br.) Remained at base headquarters
Attache Branch) in Berlin throughout the war.

Chart I

to the Chief of the Army General Staff.

As long as the mass of the German army was tied up in the Polish campaign, the eyes of the Supreme Command were anxiously directed toward the West. Neither the forces stationed there nor the stage of construction of the West Wall were even approximately sufficient to ward off with certainty an immediate full-scale attack by the French and the British. Confirmation of the pre-war prediction as to the very cautious combat methods of the French therefore produced a feeling of profound relief. After the swift completion of the Polish campaign, an Anglo - French attack was not to be expected for some time.

For the further course of the war it was now the objective to obtain as detailed a picture as possible of the strength, organization and strategic intentions of the French army and of the British, who gradually grew in strength on the continent. In addition, German intelligence had to observe continuously the strength, distribution of forces, and the military measures of the other neighboring western powers, Belgium, Holland, and Switzerland.

Intelligence on the strength of the French army was consistently good, but it was more difficult to discover the whereabouts of the uncommitted divisions, especially of the armored and motorized units. It was quite certain that an army for a main effort had been formed from them and from similar British units, which was rightly suspected to be south of the Franco-Belgian border. It remained to be clarified whether, in case of an extension of the war into Belgium and Holland, this army would counter-attack into the Belgian-Dutch area or be kept back along the northern

border of France.

In the winter of 1939-40 the reactions of the enemy to the repeatedly changed deadlines for a German offensive were kept under constant observation by means of long-range air reconnaissance and information received from agents. By this means a fairly accurate picture was obtained not only of the enemy's intention of advancing to meet a German thrust into Belgium, but also of the probable march organization and of the highways to be used. Confirming and supplementing reports on the probable objectives of the movement came through agents' reports from Belgium. The French and the British thus chose a solution which furthered the German intentions, since the planned German strategic breakthrough across the Meuse river between Givet and Sedan took them by surprise.

The strength and the organization of the British forces was hard to establish, since only a small part of these forces was employed in the front line at any given time. On the whole, however, adequate information was available on their strength and on the speed with which new British units were being activated. The painstaking pre-war studies and experience from World War I provided a good foundation for reaching a correct result.

In the case of the Belgian and the Dutch armies, the strength of which was accurately known, it was important for us to know how they grouped their forces. In each case, the center of gravity was so clearly directed against Germany that it would have been impossible for either country to meet a violation of their neutrality from another direction promptly and with sufficient forces.

It was not to be expected that France and England would make an attempt in the near future to force a decision of the war by attacking Germany. In addition to this, the disinclination of the French people toward this war made itself increasingly felt and had some influence on the fighting spirit of the French army. Numerous symptoms of this tendency were visible and it was not to be expected that time would bring about any changes. Time and again the Army General Staff had pointed out this development, deducing from it not the appropriateness of a German attack, but the possibility of applying political measures to prevent the outbreak of the hitherto dormant war in the West. The Commander in Chief of the Army failed in his attempts to have this idea accepted by the Wehrmacht High Command.

After the end of the Polish campaign and after it had become clear that the enemy in the West had not planned any major operations for the time being, the daily situation reports to the Chief of the Army General Staff and to the Commander in Chief of the Army were discontinued. The findings of the branches on the enemy situation were now reported only from time to time and the daily work became more like the peacetime routine.

Another task of the Assistant Chief of Staff IV was to form an idea of the global military-political situation and to report on it currently to his superiors and periodically to the Assistant Chief of Staff I (Operations) and his section chiefs.

In the West, cooperation with the Counterintelligence Service was particularly concerned with reconnaissance far behind the front. The

situation at the front itself was continuously clarified by the interrogation of prisoners.

Under instructions from the Chief of the Army General Staff, the Assistant Chief of Staff IV handled the correspondence with German military attaches, excluding routine matters of an administrative character, which were handled by the Attache Branch. The peacetime practice of holding an annual conference of all attaches in Berlin each winter for joint orientation and mutual discussion had to be discontinued. During the course of the war only one such conference was called at Fontainebleau after the end of the Western campaign in August 1940.

The Assistant Chief of Staff IV also handled contacts with the foreign military attaches under the direction of the Chief of the Army General Staff when the desires of the foreign attaches exceeded what the Chief of the Attache Branch could provide.

An essential task in the winter of 1939-40 was the advanced training of the intelligence officers of higher level headquarters, who were gathered in brief orientation courses at Zossen for this purpose. Here, they heard lectures on the military-political situation, on the armies of the Western Powers and on the practical performance of their tasks in the case of a western operation; furthermore, they were informed by the Counterintelligence Service of the objectives and methods of that service and by the Branch for Army Matters of its activities.

In addition, all intelligence officers down to division level were gathered behind the West Front in November 1939 and in April 1940 for a discussion of urgent intelligence problems.

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Finally, the personnel of the Counterintelligence Service were also gathered in courses for instruction on Army interests and objectives with regard to information on the enemy.

Cooperation with the Foreign Office consisted chiefly of cross-orientation and was greatly facilitated by the fact that a representative of the Foreign Office was attached to the Army High Command shortly after the beginning of the Polish campaign and was placed under the Assistant Chief of Staff IV as far as his routine duties were concerned.

Before the beginning of the war -- dating back to the days of Feldmarschall von Blomberg -- direct contact with the Foreign Office had been forbidden and a jealous watch was kept that no underground channels existed between the Army General Staff and the Foreign Office. This measure more or less intentionally paved the way toward Hitler's arbitrary and willfully blind policy, which was so harmful during the war and in peacetime and had to be by-passed somehow. However, underground connections were of little value, since nobody could make use of information obtained from the Foreign Office in reports or to bolster his arguments.

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CHAPTER 3

THE OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF IV

5 JANUARY 1941 - 9 NOVEMBER 1942

In its organisation, the office of the Assistant Chief of Staff IV remained unchanged during the latter part of the war; apart from the chief, the staff consisted of one General Staff captain, one junior grade reserve officer as an administrative officer, a number of draftsmen, clerks and orderlies. According to the locality at which the staff was employed (Chart 6), it was increased by liaison officers from other departments, such as the Western Intelligence Branch and the Attache Branch. As previously mentioned, the liaison officer from the Foreign Office and the Finnish General, both detached to the Army High Command, were attached to the staff, the latter only for a temporary period.

On 5 January 1941, a new Assistant Chief of Staff IV was appointed who, in contrast with his predecessor, was not an experienced intelligence officer and therefore required a period of thorough orientation. During his tenure of office the war expanded, from the military viewpoint, into a global war and from the politico-military viewpoint into a coalition war.

In even greater measure than before, it was now incumbent upon the Assistant Chief of Staff IV to adapt his existing organization, which had been recognized as faulty and inadequate (Part I, Chapter 1; Separation of Procurement and Evaluation Agencies) but could not be changed basically

Location of Chief of Staff IV and His Branches

January 1941 - November 1942

Period	Branch or Section	Located at
Jan-Jun 41	Assistant Chief of Staff IV, Western Int. Branch, Eastern Int. Branch, Branch for Army Matters.	Zossen (Branch Chief and Southeastern Section of Eastern Int.Branch temporarily at Wiener Neustadt).
	Attaché Branch.	Berlin.
Jun 41 - May 42	Assistant Chief of Staff IV, Eastern Int. Branch, Branch for Army Matters *, Liaison officers of Western Int. Branch and Attaché Branch.	Camp Frik, Eastern Prussia
	Western Int. Branch.	Zossen.
	Attaché Branch.	Berlin.
Jun-Oct 42	Assistant Chief of Staff IV, Eastern Int. Branch, 1st Echelon of Attaché Branch (with attached Axis generals), Liaison officer of Western Int. Branch.	Vinnitsa.
	Western Int. Branch.	Zossen.
	2d Echelon of the Attaché Branch (with military attachés from neutral countries).	Berlin.

* Transferred to General for Special Assignments in April 1942.

during the war, to meet the rapidly increasing requirements.

These efforts were impeded by a number of factors, the most important of which was the low opinion of the intelligence service generally current in General Staff circles. Psychologically, this opinion to a certain extent had been confirmed by the military successes hitherto gained without any critical developments; it led to the failure in the German army, in contrast with other armies, to recognize the importance of the Intelligence Service. As a result, the personnel assigned for this work were inadequate, both numerically and in some cases in respect to their qualifications. Repeated efforts to remedy the situation, for instance, by reserving for General Staff officers all posts as intelligence officer at corps and division levels, failed because of the lack of personnel. In cases where General Staff officers were appointed as intelligence officers with units, it frequently happened that they remained in their posts barely long enough to familiarize themselves with their duties and were then transferred for employment as operations or supply officers, which posts were considered more important. Usually, the officers themselves endeavored to obtain their transfer from the intelligence service, since the post of "Operations Officer" seemed more desirable to them. In practice it therefore often proved more advantageous to appoint reserve officers as intelligence officers in the intermediate level staffs because of their greater permanency, even though this meant that the highest standards of performance could not always be expected.

Training for intelligence work at the Kriegsakademie (Command and General Staff School) was also inadequate for the same reasons. Generally,

it was restricted to a few lectures on foreign armies, followed at best by an appropriate map exercise. In the later stages of the training courses it was excluded owing to the growing pressure of time. On the other hand, the separate Intelligence and Interpreter Courses were continued according to plan and in 1943 were even expanded to form what might be called an Intelligence School at Posen.

Nevertheless, the German Army Intelligence Service lacked the broad foundations and the consistency it required, although not to the same extent as was the case with the Counterintelligence Service. The undisguised and unfortunately not unjustified distrust of the methods employed and the results obtained by the latter service, which the Assistant Chief of Staff IV found prevalent upon his appointment to office, considerably hampered collaboration between the procuring and evaluating agencies. Proper collaboration was particularly necessary because of the organizationally unsound separation of these two services, and its lack threatened to harm the entire work. Increased personal contacts between the chief of the intelligence organization and the chief of the counterintelligence organization as well as between the personnel of the sections working under them proved an effective measure to relieve this situation.

A further, particularly important, measure undertaken by the Assistant Chief of Staff IV was the occasional assembly of representatives of all intelligence procuring agencies for an orientation, such as took place especially before the opening of any new phase of the war, for instance, prior to the Russian campaign. This led to an improved insight into the currently existing capacities and provided a basis for the assignment of

missions. A further step in this direction was the intended exchange of officers between the Intelligence, Counterintelligence and Attache Branches, of which good results were expected but the full effects of which could no longer be observed because it was introduced too late.

One of the factors that hampered the work of the Assistant Chief of Staff IV was the fact that he was never called in to attend the "Fuehrer Conferences." This remained unchanged even after Generalfeldmarschall von Brauchitsch had been removed from his post as Commander in Chief of the Army and this post had been assumed by Hitler himself. The Assistant Chief of Staff IV, as the highest intelligence authority in the Army, therefore had to base his important decisions and directives on second-hand information and was not always able to introduce the necessary organizational measures in time, and in the intelligence service it is of special importance to take such measures well in advance.

The establishment of Wehrmacht theaters of operations * had an extremely adverse effect on the work of the Army Intelligence Service. The Wehrmacht High Command itself had no adequate intelligence service for these theaters and seemingly did not intend developing any (Chapter 4, Section 2).

Repeated efforts to at least provide the operations staffs of the Wehrmacht and Army High Commands a uniform intelligence basis for the conduct of global warfare by means of written consolidated surveys of the over-all enemy situation met with sharp criticism, at least on the

* Theaters in which operations were conducted directly by the Wehrmacht High Command instead of by the Army General Staff. (Reviewer)

part of the highest authorities in the Wehrmacht High Command. This was so because the views expressed in these surveys, which were based on sober General Staff work, sometimes did not coincide with the opinions of Hitler, which were based on information derived in part from obscure sources.

The Army General Staff, on the other hand, could not make up its mind to draw the proper inferences, relative to the intelligence service, from the increasingly obvious fact that the Wehrmacht High Command was assuming responsibility for the over-all conduct of the war and to consent to the consolidation of the Intelligence Service with the Counterintelligence Service under one head in the Wehrmacht High Command. Instead , the second chief of the Army General Staff * on 9 November 1942 abolished the post of Assistant Chief of Staff IV. This resulted in a further disintegration of the foreign intelligence service. (Chapter 3).

Another factor which should not be underestimated is the psychological strain to which personnel of the Intelligence Service, particularly at the highest level, were exposed in an ever increasing measure as the result of the steadily deteriorating over-all military situation. Hand in hand with the tendency in the upper command circles to deprecate the military potentialities of the enemy, particularly Russia and later the United States of America, went the tendency to overrate German performances and particularly the potentialities of Germany. The Intelligence Service can nevertheless claim that, in the true spirit of General Staff training, it at all times reported the true situation as it saw it and never indulged

* Generaloberst Kurt Zeitzler, who was the second officer to hold the post as Chief of the Army General Staff during the war. (Reviewer)

in euphemisms. This is also true of relations between the Intelligence Service and those political agencies of the Foreign Office which were responsible for foreign policies; pursuant to an agreement between the Assistant Chief of Staff IV and the Under Secretary of State, the leading officials of that twice were briefed frankly in 1942 on the actual enemy situation, including the military potentialities of the enemy.

Hitler's mania for secrecy, arising from his conceit and his distrust, which admittedly was not always unjustified in this case, and above all his lack of understanding for all problems not connected with the continent of Europe were not only the basic cause of the inadequate psychological, organizational and operational preparations for coalition warfare on the whole, but also did much to impede the consolidation of the intelligence services of the coalition partners, which would have been advisable. As far as Germany's coalition partners on the continent of Europe were concerned, discussions between the Assistant Chief of Staff IV and the leading authorities of their intelligence services, orientation lectures to the intelligence officers of their higher level commands and the exchange of liaison officers at least succeeded in establishing a superficial coordination of concepts and uniform reporting channels. In the case of Japan, however, the distance and psychological causes restricted work to an occasional exchange of information between the intelligence procuring agencies.

It would have been logical for the military attaches to have been assigned responsible missions in the above field, but instead, the importance of the attache service declined after the beginning of the

coalition war and was restricted in an ever increasing measure to a representative mission. Military liaison, including the responsibility for reporting on the armies of the respective allies, became the responsibility of the "Liaison Staffs" or the "German Generals" attached to those armies, though the officers concerned were in some cases simultaneously attaches, as was the case in Italy and later in Hungary. Despite a careful delimitation of authority, it was impossible to avoid duplication of effort, delays and friction, particularly because of the growing tendency of the Wehrmacht High Command to assume direct control of the entire foreign intelligence service after the abolition of the post of an Assistant Chief of Staff IV.

The adaptation of the organization and working methods of the Army Intelligence Service to the missions arising from the expansion of the war have been described in Chapter 2.

Interest was centered primarily on the Russian problem, intelligence preparations for which were particularly difficult for the reasons described in Section III, Chapter 1, but also because of the exaggerated German security regulations. Thus, it was only in mid-March of 1941 that the Assistant Chief of Staff IV was officially informed of the possibility that the plans for Operation Barbarossa * might actually be put into effect. Nevertheless, it was possible to furnish the High Command an almost precise picture of the concentration of Russian forces in good time before the invasion started. This was due chiefly to radio intelligence work, which proved of constantly growing value as a source of information.

Initially, no adequate information was obtainable on the manpower

* Attack on Russia. (Reviewer)

reserves available to Russia in addition to her mobilized army, on the time that would be required to organize them for employment or on the actual materiel potentials of Russia for war. One result of this lack of information was the inadequate clarification of the enemy situation during the winter campaign of 1941. However, the long duration of the war and improved working methods later made it possible to obtain a comprehensive knowledge of Russia's manpower and war industry potential.

Credit is due to the Eastern Intelligence Branch for the fact that it furnished the High Command current information on the strength and probable direction of attack of the Russian Army, particularly after the expansion and reorganization of the branch in 1942. Thus , for instance, the development of the Stalingrad catastrophe, the turning point of the war, was no surprise for the German Intelligence Service.

For the Western Intelligence Branch the situation was more difficult. Military-geographical and military-political considerations alone made it extremely difficult to obtain information, and Hitler's intervention, which has been mentioned elsewhere and which led to an exaggerated consideration for the sensitive feelings of Italy, and his prohibition of all intelligence work in Britain and France prior to the invasion increased the existing difficulties.

After the value of the branch had been clearly vindicated in the French campaign of 1940 and after the plans to invade Britain (Operation Seeloewe) had been abandoned, the branch unjustifiably lost in importance; one reason for this was that Hitler had little interest in what he called the "war on the periphery" and judged the situation solely from the continental

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viewpoint.

Nevertheless, and in spite of the organizational difficulties described in Section I of Chapter 1, the Western Intelligence Branch on the whole directed the activities of the intelligence gathering agencies wisely during all decisive phases within its theater of operations and evaluated the results obtained so appropriately that it was able to furnish the High Command the necessary basis for its decisions; as, for instance, in the war in Africa and in respect to the military potential and state of preparedness of the USA.

Only on one subject were the results obtained by the Intelligence Service inadequate because of the lack of information procuring facilities. This was the reorganization of the British Army after Dunkirk; information on this point remained inadequate right up to the time of the invasion in 1944. Whereas it was possible to register all but one of the USA divisions transported to Britain and their assembly there, the intelligence services of the Army and Wehrmacht High Commands had to base their computations of the number of British divisions and similar units on estimates and theoretical calculations. On the whole, this resulted in an overestimate of the numerical strength of the British forces available.

The Western Intelligence Branch nevertheless realized with certainty that the invasion was not to be expected before the spring of 1944 and thereby made it possible for the German High Command to employ the forces hitherto in France elsewhere, for more decisive purposes, a possibility which was not always fully exploited. Even though it was not possible in June 1944 to predict the precise spot at which the invasion would take

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place -- due largely to the small number of persons informed on the Allied side, the extensive deceptive measures taken by the enemy and the entire lack of German air reconnaissance -- the opinions expressed as to the general direction of attack nevertheless proved correct. The different opinions held by the Wehrmacht High Command and the Army High Command on the subject of a second landing will be discussed elsewhere.

The Branch for Army Matters, which had the extremely difficult and thankless mission described in Part I, Chapter 2, a mission which was entirely outside the scope of the Intelligence Service, remained a branch of the General Staff and thereby of the Assistant Chief of Staff IV only until the spring of 1942, when it was transferred to the "General for Special Assignments in the Army High Command." In spite of the intended conciliatory nature of its functions, it until then actually waged an increasingly bitter battle against the National Socialist Party and the tendencies of that party to disintegrate the true military spirit. It also employed all means compatible with the authority of its superiors, the Commander in Chief of the Army, the Chief of the Army General Staff and the Assistant Chief of Staff IV, to insure that the troops acted according to the provisions of International Law and of Military Law. The order issued by the Commander in Chief of the Army in 1941 concerning "The Preservation of Discipline in the Army" was prepared by the Branch for Army Matters. This order was the first warning to the German troops and their commanders to also conduct the war in the East in accordance with the clean old German military tradition, and provided them with a possibility to circumvent contrary directives from the Supreme Command.

When the Branch for Army Matters was transferred from the Army General Staff, the Chief of the Army General Staff in practice lost his immediate influence on the morale of the Army although he retained the right to issue directives. The branch itself was gradually diverted from the course of its original mission and, at least in part, was finally misused as an instrument by those assistants of Hitler who thought that the salvation of the Army could be brought about only by a spirit of political fanaticism, the development of which was the mission of the National Socialist guidance officers attached to all units of the armed forces.

CHAPTER 4

RESULTS OF THE ABOLITION OF THE POST OF ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF IV

After the post of Assistant Chief of Staff IV had been abolished, the Western and Eastern Intelligence Branches and the Attaché Branch were placed directly under the Chief of the Army General Staff. This new arrangement did not meet the requirements at that phase of the war. The main disadvantages were as follows:

a. It was absolutely essential to have consolidated evaluations of the over-all enemy situation and uniform handling of intelligence on the enemy in all countries and all theaters; after the abolition of the highest intelligence authority in the Army, this was no longer guaranteed. The chiefs of the Western and Eastern Intelligence Branches now each evaluated the situation in his own branch separately and the preparation of a general evaluation of the enemy situation by a responsible person was discontinued.

b. The Chief of the Army General Staff had no decisive influence on the conduct of war in the so-called Wehrmacht High Command theaters of war -- the Mediterranean area, Atlantic front, Norway, Finland -- so that the results of the work of the Western Intelligence Branch, which was responsible for these theaters, was only of secondary interest to him. After the abolition of the post of Assistant Chief of Staff IV, the Western Intelligence Branch should have been placed directly under the Operations Staff of the Wehrmacht High Command in order to create a clear

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chain of command. However, this step was not taken. The branch remained under the Chief of the Army General Staff and only cooperated directly with the Wehrmacht Operations Staff, which had only a small and inadequately staffed intelligence branch. Owing to its lack of data and expert personnel, this branch had to rely exclusively on the Western Intelligence Branch. The physical separation of these two branches -- the Wehrmacht Operations Staff was in Eastern Prussia and the Western Intelligence Branch in the vicinity of Berlin -- made cooperation difficult.

It was therefore difficult and often impossible for the branch handling intelligence on the enemy in the Wehrmacht High Command theaters to have its views accepted or to present a true evaluation of the enemy situation to the Supreme Command with the necessary emphasis.

c. Close cooperation between the two intelligence branches * and with the Attaché Branch, a valuable source of information, lacked the necessary control by a responsible authority and was also difficult because of their widely separated localities. A proper exchange of ideas and information was no longer guaranteed.

d. The maintenance of contact with the intelligence procuring agencies within and outside of the armed forces was now the responsibility of the two branches *. Although it usually proved possible to secure adequate cooperation by means of direct personal contact with the chiefs and specialists of the appropriate branches and sections, the two branches * found it difficult to have their basic desires complied with. In this

* The Western and Eastern Intelligence Branches of the Army High Command.

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respect, and also in cooperation with other agencies, the higher authority of a joint superior would have been necessary.

e. There was no longer a uniform control over the orientation of allied countries and friendly neutrals. The chiefs of the two branches themselves had to consider what current information should or could be passed on to those countries, submit their suggestions to the Chief of the Army General Staff, or to the Wehrmacht Operations Staff for approval, and then pass on the information through their own channels or through the Attache Branch.

f. The education and advanced training of officers employed in the Intelligence Service lacked planned control. Here also, it was left to the initiative of the branches to conduct separate or joint courses of instruction.

In summarizing, it therefore must be said that serious disadvantages resulted from the abolition of the post of an Army Chief Intelligence Office and that the small reductions in personnel obtained by no means offset these disadvantages.

PART TWO

THE WESTERN AND EASTERN INTELLIGENCE BRANCHES

1941 - 1944

Basically, the organization and working methods of these two branches were the same; they are therefore being treated jointly in this part of the present study. Minor differences will be pointed out wherever necessary. As far as is possible within the confines of this study, wartime incidents will be cited briefly as examples.

The only written records available to the writer were a few tables of organization of the Eastern Intelligence Branch and the Southeastern Section of that branch. All other work was done from memory. In his work, the author was assisted by the former chiefs of the England and France Sections -- the latter of whom was later operations officer of the Western Intelligence Branch, and both of whom worked for about four years in that branch -- and by the former chief of the Intelligence Procuring and Evaluating Sub-Section of the Russia Section of the Eastern Intelligence Branch, who, however, served in the branch for only a brief period.

In view of this paucity of data, minor discrepancies are unavoidable but no serious errors are likely to have occurred. The period dealt with extends from the outbreak of the war to early 1945. The last few months of warfare could not be dealt with owing to the entire lack of data and the fact that no persons qualified to give information on that period were available.

CHAPTER 5

ORGANIZATION OF THE WESTERN AND EASTERN INTELLIGENCE BRANCHES

The peacetime organization of the agencies handling information on foreign armies within the Army High Command had proved satisfactory and therefore was retained during the war without any basic changes. The geographical grouping, in particular, was retained.

At the outbreak of war the 3d Branch of the Army General Staff, which handled the western group of countries, was redesignated "Abteilung Fremde Heere West" * and the 12th Branch, which handled eastern countries, "Abteilung Fremde Heere Ost" **.

On the whole, the delimitation of the responsibilities of these two branches also remained unchanged during the war, with only minor occasional adjustments to meet special situations or made necessary by the conduct of the war. Such adjustments included, for instance, the temporary consolidation of all intelligence work on the Balkan countries and the Middle East in an independent section, the "Southeastern Intelligence Section" and the transfer of intelligence work on the USA between the two branches.

The geographical grouping of work on foreign armies corresponded to the distribution of responsibilities for evaluating the enemy situation in the various theaters of operations, each branch handling the theaters within its areas. A basic regulation in this respect was that, if armed

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* Referred to as the Western Intelligence Branch in this study.
** Referred to as the Eastern Intelligence Branch in this study.

units of a country handled by one branch were employed by the enemy in a theater within the area of the other branch, the branch responsible for the area of employment would handle tactical and operational intelligence, while the branch responsible for the home country of the enemy units would continue to handle all matters of a statistical nature, such as strengths, organization, armament and equipment. If the possibility arose of the responsibility for situation evaluations overlapping within a theater of operations, the delimitation of responsibilities was regulated in each individual case either by command or by mutual agreement. The organization of the two branches during the more important phase of their development during the war and the organization of the Southeastern Intelligence Section are shown in Charts H - P.

In broad outline, intelligence work was arranged as follows during the war:

During the Polish campaign, the Eastern Intelligence Branch was responsible for reports on the enemy situation while the Western Intelligence Branch watched developments in the western countries, with main emphasis on Britain and France. Then, immediately prior to and during the campaign in the West, the Western Branch was responsible for the evaluation of the enemy situation.

During the operations in Norway and Denmark, which were conducted directly by the Operations Staff of the Wehrmacht High Command, a special arrangement was made, according to which the Eastern Intelligence Branch handled intelligence on the Norwegian and Danish forces while the Western Intelligence Branch was responsible for situation evaluations in all

sectors where British, French and Polish units were employed, the latter as units of the French Army. Any overlapping which resulted was of small consequence owing to the minor importance of the Norwegian and Danish forces.

During the Balkan campaign, the Eastern Intelligence Branch was responsible for evaluation of the enemy situation. For this purpose, the branch chief and the necessary key personnel transferred to the advanced headquarters of the Army High Command at Wiener-Neustadt while the bulk of the branch remained at Zossen.

With the opening of the Russian campaign, emphasis in respect to evaluation of the enemy situation shifted definitely to the Eastern Intelligence Branch which, for this reason, was transferred to Army High Command Field Headquarters in Eastern Prussia. Chiefly because of the favorable communication facilities to the West and the South, the Western Intelligence Branch remained at base headquarters in Zossen, where it was employed mainly in observing the preparations of the Allies for the invasion and evaluating the situation in Africa, Sicily and Italy as well as in French overseas territories during the minor campaigns there.

To relieve the strain on the Eastern Intelligence Branch, which was fully occupied by the Russian campaign, and to meet the requirements of certain plans for the Middle East, intelligence work on all countries in the Near and Middle East was temporarily grouped together under an independent sub-section, the Southeastern Intelligence Sub-Section, in the late autumn of 1941. This sub-section, the organization of which is shown in Chart P, was immediately responsible to the Assistant Chief of Staff IV

and, in addition to intelligence on the enemy situation in Iran and Irak, handled the partisan situation in the Balkans. On 1 January 1943, this sub-section was dissolved; the Arab states were transferred to the Western Intelligence Branch because of the steadily growing British influence in the Middle East, while the Eastern Intelligence Branch was assigned responsibility for southeastern Europe, Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan.

When the USA entered the war, it seemed desirable for technical reasons to have intelligence work on the US forces, hitherto handled by the England Section of the Western Intelligence Branch, transferred to the Eastern Intelligence Branch in order to have all records on this highly important subject available at headquarters in Eastern Prussia. Around the spring of 1943, responsibilities for work on USA, Japan and China were grouped together under the Pacific Section, which now assumed responsibility for evaluating the situation in the Far Eastern theater of operations and in the adjacent countries.

The Anglo-American landings in French Northern Africa brought about an entirely new situation, since US forces had now appeared for the first time in the Mediterranean and thus in the European theater so that, from the German point of view, America's point of main effort was now clearly defined as being in the West. This situation was met by the transfer of the entire Pacific Group to the Western Intelligence Branch, within which intelligence on the enemy in the Mediterranean became of steadily growing importance. In order to obtain uniform handling of all countries involved, all countries of the Middle East and the entire Balkan area, in which British influence was in the ascendancy, were also later transferred to

the Western Intelligence Branch.

As the result of this new delimitation, the Eastern Intelligence Branch now was responsible only for intelligence on Russia, Finland and the northern states as well as for the evaluation of the enemy situation on the eastern and northern fronts, while all other countries and all other theaters were handled by the Western Intelligence Branch. This grouping of areas and responsibilities remained unchanged to the end of the war. (Charts 4 - 8.)

The following may be said about the number of personnel assigned to carry out the great amount of work described above and their qualifications:

On principle, personnel strengths were kept as low as possible and usually maintained at the minimum level compatible with the work that was to be performed. Furthermore, the majority of the noncommissioned officers and men employed were replaced by woman auxiliaries during the war. An idea of the personnel requirements can be gained from the following table showing the personnel employed by the Western Intelligence Branch in 1943-44:

Section	General Staff officers	Other officers and officials	NCOs, men and woman auxiliaries
C of S and Op Officer	2	0	3
I (Pol Sect)	0	1	6
II	1	7	7
III	2	6	13
IV	1	4	6
V	1	5	7
Draftsmen	0	1	4
Total	7	24	46

Of the 46 personnel listed in the last column, 34 were woman auxiliaries. In addition, 1 NCO and 14 men were employed as orderlies, drivers, so that at the time when it was biggest, the Western Intelligence Branch employed all in all 31 officers and officials (of whom 7 were GSC officers) and 60 NCOs, men, and woman auxiliaries.

No records are available on the total personnel strength of the Eastern Intelligence Branch. The only figures on hand show the number of officer personnel employed in the branch, which increased considerably during the war, as shown by the following statement:

	1941	1942	1943
GSC officers	5	8	11
Other officers and officials	9	21	42
Total	14	29	53

The figures for 1941 include only personnel in the Russia Section.

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To meet the requirements in the intelligence branches, personnel had to be highly qualified. As far as General Staff officers were concerned, only those who were sober minded, able to think clearly and rationally, gifted with imaginative powers and constructive reasoning, and had reached a certain maturity were suitable for this type of employment or for assignment as intelligence officer in one of the higher field commands. In addition, such men required a sufficient fund of experience in the German Army and the ability to recognize important features among the mass of information received, to realize the interrelations between various items and to formulate quickly and concisely the results obtained from the available data. A knowledge of at least one foreign language was indispensable, personal experience from travel abroad and a previous occupation with the literature of the country involved were desirable.

As specialists, it was possible to use elderly officers who had acquired specialized knowledge through long employment in the branches, through travel abroad, or through a study of foreign military literature, as well as officers of the reserve who had gained appropriate practical experience in foreign countries.

While the above two categories proved suitable above all for work of a statistical nature, younger officers who had been injured were usually employed at evaluating the enemy situation.

So far as NCOs, men, and woman auxiliaries were concerned, a knowledge of a foreign language was required in addition to normal clerical experience, and on the whole only well qualified, thoroughly reliable persons could be employed. It was found that, owing to the time required to

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assistant personnel to their work, the quality of performances suffered from too frequent changes of personnel.

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CHAPTER 6

SOURCES OF INFORMATION AND THEIR CLASSIFICATION

During the war a great number of sources of information on the enemy were available to the responsible branches. The nature of the sources and the degree of their reliability varied widely in the various countries and theaters of operations. Prior to the opening of each new phase of the war, it was necessary to supplement or correct the information obtained from these sources and from then on to maintain a current picture of the enemy situation which could be used by the supreme command and by other high level headquarters as a basis for their decisions and measures. The available sources of information will now be enumerated briefly, together with an evaluation of their degree of importance in compiling a picture of the enemy situation.

I. INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION FROM THE TROOPS

The basis for the preparation and maintenance of the enemy situation map was provided by the intelligence reports from higher level field commands, namely from army groups and armies, supplemented by reports from the operations sections of the same headquarters. The reports reached both the Western and Eastern Intelligence Branch daily by teletype in the form of morning and evening reports and in prescribed order contained:

1. information on all combat events subsequent to the previous report;

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2. an evaluation of the latest information on the strength and organization of enemy units;

3. information on newly identified enemy units and on prisoners captured;

4. a brief evaluation of the supposed next intentions of the enemy or of the possibilities open to the enemy.

On the basis of these reports the enemy situation map was prepared, the chief feature of which was a presentation of the units identified as being employed by the enemy. They were also the basis for the description of the events of the day contained in the daily situation report. Advance reports were telephoned in immediately by the army group or army intelligence officers on any important items, such as newly identified enemy units.

The estimates of the presumed enemy intentions contained in the operational and intelligence reports were supplemented by more copious evaluations of the enemy situation. These evaluations were prepared by army group or army headquarters from all available information and submitted whenever necessary. Generally speaking, the intelligence reports summarized all information on the enemy that had been obtained through the various channels available and stated the inferences to be drawn therefrom. The information thus furnished was then checked against and supplemented by reports not available to the army groups and armies for use by the two branches in their evaluation of the situation.

Statements by prisoners and deserters were taken down in writing by the combat units and were used by the army groups and armies in their

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intelligence reports and then forwarded to the two branches for thorough examination. Owing to the extensive knowledge these branches had of the enemy army involved and the better training of their personnel, they often were able to draw conclusions from the prisoner statements which the units at lower level were unable to draw. Prisoners and deserters who might be able to give more detailed information because of their high rank or specialized knowledge were occasionally brought to the offices of the two branches for direct interrogation. In addition, interrogation teams were sent to focal centers of battle, where it was to be expected that a large number of prisoners might be taken. Owing to the specialized training of the personnel in these teams and by exploiting the nervous shock which most prisoners suffered immediately after their capture, particularly good results were often obtained by this means.

Information from prisoners and deserters was mainly useful to establish the strength, equipment and organization of the enemy, furnishing primarily statistical information for the intelligence reports, but they also afforded a good insight into the morale of the enemy troops. The value of these statements varied widely.

Prisoners from the western countries, particularly officers and the more intelligent types, usually remained silent, as they had been ordered to do. On the other hand, Russian prisoners and deserters, particularly officers and even high ranking officers, were often induced to give valuable information and even to write detailed reports, so that a large number of high-ranking Russian officers were sometimes employed by the Eastern Intelligence Branch. This was true especially in the 1941-43

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period. In contrast, the majority of the prisoners from the lower ranks in the West and South could not or would not even state the designation of their own units, let alone the divisions of which they were part, while Russians spoke quite openly on such matters.

Captured service regulations and other documents were to be retained by the intelligence officers of the capturing units and the higher field commands for only a short while for examination to establish the organization and immediate intentions of the enemy forces and were then to be turned over to the two branches in the original. Such documents frequently furnished excellent information. Thus, for instance, the addresses on letters found on prisoners and dead prior to the opening of the French campaign of 1940 furnished valuable information on the French Army and on the aggressiveness and morale of the French troops and at the same time frequently made tactical deductions possible; when the archives of the French Ministry of War were captured, it was found that they contained the complete files on the meetings of the Allied Council of War; in Norway and Africa, documents were captured from British units which gave information of fundamental importance on the strength and organization of the forces available to Britain.

Captured weapons and equipment furnished valuable information on the armament and equipment of the army involved. The collection of such materiel was the responsibility of the quartermaster services, its technical examination that of the Army Ordnance Office. The intelligence officers with field commands were required to collaborate closely with the appropriate quartermaster agencies. In this way it was possible to verify the accuracy

of rumors, press reports, intelligence information and statements made by prisoners about new types of equipment in the enemy armies and to correct the information already recorded on such subjects. Thus, for instance, a few Churchill tanks were captured during the British landing at Dieppe. These were the first tanks of this type which fell into German hands. Until then, information about them had been entirely inadequate. Usually, information on new weapons and items of equipment in the enemy armies was furnished to the troops in the "Odd Items of the Intelligence Service."

The after-action reports generally submitted by field commands after a campaign or at the end of one phase of an operation provided the necessary knowledge of the experience gained by the troops in action and information on the combat efficiency of the enemy. Usually, such information was checked against appropriate captured service regulations and prisoner or deserter statements and then summarized. It also was used in the preparation of the appropriate chapters of the manual published on the army concerned.

II. INFORMATION FROM OTHER BRANCHES OF THE ARMY HIGH COMMAND

Contact with the Operations Branch was particularly close, since the intelligence reports and evaluations prepared by the Western and Eastern Intelligence Branches were of particular importance to that branch as a basis for its measures. On the other hand, the reports reaching the Operations Branch through command channels contained information that was of basic importance to the two intelligence branches. Collaboration was secured through the mutual participation of the branch chiefs in the

daily situation discussions, through frequent personal discussions and through close personal contact between the operations and intelligence officers in the various sectors of the fronts.

For a considerable time the Attache Branch was closely linked with the two branches because of its also being placed under the Assistant Chief of Staff IV. It furnished information received through the German attaches abroad or from the accredited attaches of foreign countries in Berlin. The information from the German attaches abroad was derived from data made available to the attaches by the general staffs of the countries they were in, from personal observations, from talks at foreign agencies or with foreign officers and from press and radio reports. Special importance was attached to the reports from attaches in countries with which Germany was expected to be involved in war and those countries with which war was imminent. It is only natural that the importance of reports from attaches decreased as the war expanded and the number of German legations abroad decreased.

Information furnished by the Signal Intelligence Service, formerly called "Intercept Reconnaissance," was of decisive importance for both intelligence branches. The functions of the Signal Intelligence Service included the interception and deciphering of foreign military radio messages, the locating of field and central radio stations, the identification of radio traffic systems and their type of traffic and similar missions. During the war this entire field was the responsibility of the Army Chief Signal Officer.

The information obtained by the signal intelligence units was

forwarded to the signal intelligence control points, one for the East and one for the West, with which points both intelligence branches maintained close contact, and were published daily in the "Signal Intelligence Reports."

In spite of occasional enemy attempts at deception, reports from the Signal Intelligence Service were generally classified as "from a reliable source." The results obtained varied periodically and in the separate theaters of operations. Nevertheless they can be described as good, particularly in view of the small number of signal intelligence units available and their inadequate technical equipment. They furnished a valuable basis in the preparation of enemy evaluations, particularly information from far behind the enemy lines. The results were interpreted and passed on in the situation reports, the intelligence reports and the situation maps. As was the case with the interrogation of prisoners, signal intelligence also brought particularly good results in the East, obtaining information both from the front and from areas far behind the enemy front. By intercepting railway radio traffic, for example, it was possible to trace almost all troop transport movements from the Far East.

Cooperation of the two intelligence branches with the Organization and the Training Branches made available the experience of combat units in respect to enemy organizations, status of training and methods of combat and thus supplemented the reports received through normal intelligence channels.

The Army Ordnance Office furnished information on the experience gained by the troops and in the proving stations of the Ordnance Office

in respect to captured arms and equipment. This information was used chiefly in the "Odd Items of the Intelligence Service." In addition, the Ordnance Office provided information on the producing capacities and the industrial output of enemy countries. This information was required in assessing armament potentials and the speed at which new units could be activated.

III. INFORMATION FROM WEHRMACHT HIGH COMMAND AGENCIES

Of these agencies, the Counterintelligence Office was the most important source, which furnished the most numerous reports on the enemy. The Counterintelligence Office was restricted exclusively to the procurement of information, the interpretation and evaluation of which was the responsibility of the Western and Eastern Intelligence Branches. Messages received by the office therefore were forwarded to the two branches in the original text. The name of the procuring agent was not disclosed, the message being identified only by a cipher.

The two branches were authorized to request the Counterintelligence Office to direct its activities towards specific desired objectives and to obtain information on specific matters. Owing to the great difficulty of procuring information on the enemy, particularly because of Germany's geographical position and the lack of personnel and the difficulty of obtaining foreign currencies, the reliability of the counterintelligence reports was low in comparison with the large volume of reports received. Whereas information on the identification of units, armament, organization, fortifications, and so forth, was adequate in the West it was inadequate

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in the East. In matters of decisive importance, such as the date and direction of the Anglo-American invasion, no accurate information was procurable.

The agencies that censored foreign mails in occupied territories, which were also controlled by the Counterintelligence Office, deserve mention here. Occasionally, they were able to furnish valuable military information from the mails they handled.

The Foreign Group (Amtsgruppe Ausland), originally a part of the Counterintelligence Office, furnished primarily information of a politico-military nature. This information was of little importance in real intelligence work and was used only occasionally in completing the interpretation of the enemy situation. However, the group also published the "Foreign Press Reports" daily. This paper was a digest of all the more important news items taken from all newspapers that could be procured from all countries of the world on a scale that the two branches naturally could not have read. In spite of press censorship measures, it was often possible to draw conclusions of a military nature from these items; these conclusions also were used primarily in the evaluations of the enemy.

In like manner, the two branches daily received what were called "cryptographic messages." These messages were intercepted and translated by the Cryptographic Branch of the Signal Communications Group in the Wehrmacht High Command from the radio broadcasts of all nations and often contained useful items of military news. However, such information was similar to that obtained from the press in that it had to be checked against reports from other sources for confirmation. In addition, the

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Signal Communications Group currently furnished what were called the "VN Reports." These were the decoded and translated messages of non-military organs, such as embassies and legations, which had been intercepted. The majority of these messages were of a political nature, but they frequently contained reports and information from which military deductions could be drawn, so that they also could be used in the estimates of the enemy.

In addition to the previously mentioned Army Ordnance Office, the Military Economy and Armaments Office also furnished information on the armament production capacities of hostile countries. Upon request, this office placed its records at the disposal of the two intelligence branches. From the computations of the output of the American armament industry compiled by the office, information was obtained that made it possible, for instance, to check reports from other sources concerning the rate at which the US Army could activate units.

In concluding this category of sources, mention must be made of the German Armistice Commission. The commission was able to obtain information through its inspections of the interim army France was allowed to maintain after the campaign in the west. This information, and above all information which the commission was able to obtain from Africa, furnished the Western Intelligence Branch with valuable data for use in intelligence work on France.

IV. THE OTHER BRANCHES OF THE WEHRMACHT

So far as the Luftwaffe was concerned, any information that branch could furnish on hostile air forces and the results of air reconnaissance

were highly important to the two intelligence branches. This information was furnished in the form of air situation reports or in separate reports prepared by the Intelligence Branch of the Luftwaffe Operations Staff, which were submitted either directly or through the Luftwaffe General attached to the Army High Command. In the early phases of the war, the close contact maintained with the Luftwaffe brought excellent results, particularly during the campaigns in the West and in Africa and during the opening stages of the Russian campaign. However, the value of this source decreased as the German air force declined in strength. Thus, it was utterly impossible in 1944 to keep under observation the ports of embarkation for the invasion, which were on the southern coast of England. As source of information that was of decisive importance in estimating the potential and intentions of the enemy thus gradually sank in importance as the war drew on.

The situation was similar with respect to the Navy. Contact with the 1st and 3d Branches of the Naval Operations Staff during the first half of the war furnished an adequate knowledge of the strength and disposition of hostile naval forces, the tonnage of their mercantile fleets and the movements of convoys, but the amount of information thus furnished gradually decreased. Nevertheless, it was still possible generally to record convoy movements, for instance the movement of all troop convoys from the USA, and to use this information in evaluating the enemy situation. Radio interception and the locating of radio traffic played a major role in this work.

The fact that during the Anglo-American landing in French North

Africa only the forces landing on the coast of the Mediterranean were identified, while the forces operating against the coast of Morocco were observed by neither German air nor naval reconnaissance, shows how far the value of these two sources of information had decreased at that stage of the war. As the war continued, the value of both sources decreased still further.

V. SOURCES OUTSIDE THE ARMED FORCES

The only non-military official agencies that were of any importance as sources of information were the Foreign Office, the Research Office of the Reich Air Ministry and, to a lesser extent, the Security Service of the Reich Central Security Department *. These agencies now and again furnished reports, the contents of which were usually of a politico-military nature, those of the Research Office generally coinciding with the radio messages intercepted by the Signal Communications Group. These three sources were not of great importance in the procurement of information on the enemy.

The records of the Reich Ministry for Occupied Territories and of the Institute for Eastern Affairs (Ostinstitut), both in Koenigsberg, Eastern Prussia, were also available to the Eastern Intelligence Branch. Primarily, these records furnished information of a statistical nature on economics, population figures, food situations and so forth. Occasionally, direct assistance was given by German industrial circles in problems concerning the Russian armament potential and industry.

* More commonly known as the SD (Reviewer).

VI. FOREIGN PRESS AND RADIO

In addition to the digests of press and radio news furnished by the foreign press reports of the Foreign Group and the Cryptographic Branch of the Wehrmacht High Command, the two branches found it necessary to read certain foreign newspapers carefully and to monitor certain foreign radio stations themselves. In addition to politico-military items, the newspapers obtained through the military attaches and the Counterintelligence Office frequently contained detailed information that was useful to supplement the general picture and to check the accuracy of reports from other sources. In like manner, certain radio stations in enemy and neutral countries sometimes broadcast information that was of military importance. The following are a few examples: Prior to and during the preparations for the 1940 offensive in the West, press reports on sports events made it possible to draw conclusions as to the billeting areas of units behind the front and of the strategic reserves. Occasional press and radio reports on military leaders, their transfer, or the fact that they had been assigned other missions, made it possible to correct the records on top level enemy commanders and to draw conclusions as to what the enemy was planning. Finally, prior to and during the invasion, British radio stations broadcast code messages to the resistance groups in France and certain inferences could be drawn from these messages.

It will be seen from the above that it was possible to consider the press and radio services as useful sources of information in spite of the danger of deceptive measures by the enemy. However, it was absolutely essential to check information from these sources against reports from

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other sources for accuracy.

VII. AXIS POWERS AND FRIENDLY NEUTRALS

The volume and the value of information received from these sources varied widely. It must be admitted that they furnished useful details occasionally, but throughout the entire war no information of vital importance was procured through these channels. This was due to the fact that the countries concerned could not obtain much information, which was an expensive item, and in many cases to the fact that their methods of interpreting were not highly enough developed.

The most important sources of information available to the two intelligence branches are summarized in Chart T.

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CHAPTER 7

WORKING METHODS

After they had been looked over by the Chief of Staff or the Operations Officer, the numerous reports received by the two intelligence branches from various sources were distributed to the specialists through the country-groups for immediate processing.

In using the material, it was important to check each report carefully for reliability in order to avoid being misled intentionally; inaccuracies also had to be spotted and eliminated. It was considered extremely important to check all reports from sources not classified as reliable against reports from other sources for confirmation. This was the only way to obtain a reliable picture of the enemy. It is self-evident that only personnel who were suitable by reason of their inclinations and previous experience could be used for this kind of work, and only after careful training.

Fundamentally, all work of the two intelligence branches was broken down into a process of a statistical nature -- during which the available information was examined for items on strengths, organizations, officer appointments, armament, equipment, tactical views, and so forth -- and the actual work of compiling the enemy situation, which was to provide a picture of the enemy's behavior in the various sectors of the front or in the various areas. Both fields required the application of politico-military, military-geographical and military-economical knowledge.

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The results of the interpretations were then entered in the "Evidence on the Enemy" published by the two branches. In addition, the volume of the information received and the wide field to be covered made it necessary to enter the results in card indexes in order to obtain a better over-all view and to facilitate the checking of reports. The number, nature and size of the indexes maintained by the two branches differed according to their fields of responsibility.

The following indexes were of vital importance:

1. Index of Units. Generally speaking, this index contained all information obtained about identified units, in part down to company level — as was the case with specialized units. In this index it was therefore possible to trace all movements of a unit from the day it had first been identified. Information on what division a unit belonged to, the chain of command, and on the combat efficiency of the unit was also given together with other items.

2. Officer Index. The names of all officers and any particulars known about them were entered here. In the case of big armies, only officers in the higher ranks were included. This index was of particular value in work on enemy high level commands, in evaluating the significance of enemy officer appointments, in estimating the probable intentions of the enemy and in analysing information given by prisoners.

3. Counterespionage Index. This index contained brief statements on the reliability of reports from agents of the Counterespionage Office, who were known only by code numbers, and facilitated the reliability classification of reports coming through the Counterespionage Office.

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With the aid of this index it was possible to furnish the Counterespionage Office a basis upon which to assess the value of its agents.

4. Fortifications Index. All the more important data on various forts and fortification systems were registered in this index. By this means the most detailed and complete picture possible was to be obtained gradually of the fortifications concerned. These particulars were used in compiling the more important studies on hostile national fortifications.

The reports were not only entered in the card indexes but were also collected and filed according to subject. This facilitated checking, made it possible to answer inquiries immediately and insured that all data on any certain subject would be available immediately.

Statistical data were available as a basis for the highly important calculation of the manpower potentials of the various countries -- from which it was possible to deduce the size of the army a country could mobilize -- and the current state of the depletion of its manpower reserves. These statistical data had been collected carefully before the war and were kept up to date by occasional press and radio reports, which made it possible to check the records, and above all by means of captured documents, of which tables of organization were highly important. Thus, for instance, it was possible during the Russian campaign to form an accurate estimate of Russia's manpower potential.

The figures obtained by means of these computations could then be compared with the figures for the units known to exist and thus made it possible to estimate the state of depletion of the manpower reserves of a country or the possibility of that country to activate more units. To

obtain a clear picture, the capacities and actual output of the armament industry, that is to say, the armament potential of a country, also had to be taken into consideration, for which purpose the records of the Army Armament Office and of the Military Economy and Armament Office were available.

Information on the top-level military and political leaders in the countries under study was obtained chiefly from press and radio reports -- reports on meetings, for instance, or on debates in parliaments and senates. This information was supplemented by captured documents, statements by prisoners, counterintelligence and attache reports; from this conglomeration a clear picture of the enemy command and its leading members gradually evolved, from which the intentions of the enemy command could be deduced.

The organization of enemy units usually could be established accurately from statements made by prisoners and deserters as well as from captured documents. In most cases it was possible to find out all particulars on strengths, armament and equipment (the latter two items with the assistance of the Army Ordnance Office). This information in turn made it possible to compute the strength of the enemy, with respect to personnel and materiel, on the various fronts.

Data on fortifications was obtained from budget debates, counterintelligence reports, press reports and air photos and was supplemented by prisoner statements, observations made by officers traveling abroad and attache reports. Thus, for instance, all technical details of the Maginot Line were precisely known, so that there was no possibility of

any surprise at the opening of the Western campaign in 1940.

Information on doctrines and combat methods was obtained primarily from service regulations, which had been captured or were furnished by the Counterintelligence Office, plus the observations made by German units. This information supplemented the picture obtained during peace, which was based on a study of the appropriate military literature, on the observations made by German officers detached as observers at maneuvers in foreign countries and especially on attache reports. Reports on actual experience in the field came from the troops through intelligence and operational channels and completed the picture, at the same time furnishing data on the combat efficiency of the hostile army and its various units.

In working on the enemy situation it was essential to observe the course of battle on the various fronts and to compile therefrom a clear picture of enemy procedures for the High Command and for the field army. For this purpose all items of information coming from the various sources were utilized, above all, those coming from the combat units; the results obtained in the statistical processes were also used in the interpretation part of the work.

A further responsibility of those handling work on the enemy situation, the Enemy Situations Sub-Sections, was to prepare "Estimates of the Enemy" insofar as these were not prepared by the Branch Chief or the Operations Officer, in which case the sub-sections at least had to furnish the data for the estimates. The main sources available for this purpose were the enemy evaluations submitted by the higher level field commands,

which had to be supplemented by a study of maps and reports not available to the field commands and by considerations of a politico-military, military-geographical and military-economic nature. Furthermore, the circumstances of the grand strategy of the enemy and the political causes and objectives of that strategy had to be taken into consideration.

Further information on the working methods of the intelligence branches is offered in Chart U, which shows the normal routine of a working day in the Eastern Intelligence Branch. Individual items of experience gained in the procurement and interpretation of information are summarised in Chart V.

CHAPTER 8

DISSEMINATION OF INTELLIGENCE

The most important and most obvious result of the evaluating work was to be found in the enemy evidence reports, work on which much resembled the composition of a mosaic picture. These reports were furnished to both superior and subordinate headquarters at specified intervals or on special request. The more important enemy evidence reports handled will now be described briefly, with details on the intervals at which they were prepared and the agencies to which they were furnished.

1. Situation reports were prepared and distributed daily (twice daily during critical periods) for the East and for the West. They contained all important information on the enemy received within the preceding few hours and summarized the enemy situation in the various sectors, reports or confirmation of reports on newly activated enemy units, organization and chains of command of the enemy units and the more important results obtained by air and naval reconnaissance so far as these were available to the Army. The reports were distributed to all agencies of the High Command and to field commands down to army level (inclusive) in writing, but extracts were forwarded by teletype in order to save time. The armies passed on the reports as Item 1 (Intelligence Annex) in operational orders; at corps and division level the information was passed on in orders as "local enemy situation." (Chapter 9).

2. Situation maps and, at irregular intervals, situation sketches,

were attached to the daily situation reports and served to present a visual picture of the enemy situation and to supplement the written text. These data were prepared on the basis of the work done by the individual sections and sub-sections of the intelligence branches, particularly on the basis of the work done by the enemy situation sub-sections.

3. Enemy estimate summaries (East and West) were usually distributed daily simultaneously with the situation reports. They contained all the latest findings and conclusions as to the presumed intentions of the enemy command and were often accompanied by explanatory sketches. They were distributed to only a small circle restricted to the more important Wehrmacht and Army High Command agencies and occasionally to army groups. Together with the situation reports, these summaries served the High Command as a basis for its decisions.

4. Strategic studies, which were detailed enemy appreciation reports, were prepared when required, particularly when any exceptionally important information arrived and prior to any intended German or expected enemy operation. These studies presented an over-all picture of enemy large-scale measures, strength ratios, and conclusions drawn as to the decisions the enemy could be expected to make. Frequently, politico-military, geographical and economical factors had to be taken into consideration. Generally, the reports were distributed only to the Wehrmacht High Command, the Chief of the Army General Staff and the Army Operations Branch, but when necessary copies were sent to the commander in chief of the theater involved and to the other branches of the Wehrmacht. Usually, the enemy appreciation summaries and the special strategic studies were prepared by

the Branch Chief or the Operations Officer.

5. General surveys were prepared as a further supplement to the situation reports. They were prepared only by the Western Intelligence Branch and contained information that was more of a statistical nature and had formerly been included in the situation reports although it had no direct bearing on the enemy situation in the various sectors of the front. Such information included the strength and tables of organization of enemy divisions, newly activated units not yet employed at the front, information on enemy armament, equipment, and other items which would have made the situation reports too bulky. Each survey dealt with a separate enemy country (for instance, USA - General Survey) and was prepared by the section responsible for intelligence work on that country. The surveys were prepared at irregular intervals according to information available and were distributed down to the level of armies, as was the case with the situation reports.

6. Special studies were prepared when particularly important information was on hand or when requested by the High Command. They dealt with the possibilities open to and the probable action of the enemy command under certain given circumstances. In these studies, the final item of which was the presumed future action of the enemy, due consideration was given to all contributing factors, such as strength ratios, the air and naval situation, geographical, political and economic considerations. Appropriate sketches were included, together with compilations of the enemy strength, armored and artillery strengths, details on transportation and communication conditions, suitability of the terrain for armored

operations, and so forth. Studies and reports of this type assisted the High Command in reaching long-range decisions, for instance at the close of one phase of an operation or prior to the commencement of German or enemy operations. Usually they were prepared by the Branch Chief together with the Operations Officer, aided by their assistants. Distribution was very restricted, copies going only to the Wehrmacht Operations Staff and the Chief of the Army General Staff or to the Commander in Chief of the Army and the Operations Branch of the Army General Staff according to the contents.

7. Information that could be useful to intelligence officers at all levels in all types of staffs and headquarters was published at long intervals in various forms. The more important of the publications were the following:

a. Manuals on Foreign Armies

b. Pocketbooks on Foreign Armies

c. Illustrations of Foreign Uniforms

d. Foreign Tables of Organization

e. Rosters of Foreign General Officers

In the case of items a to c, a separate volume was prepared on each of the more important countries at war with Germany.

The Manuals on Foreign Armies were intended for constant use by intelligence officers and contained all information normally used in interpreting reports on the enemy such as

a list of all known troop units of the country concerned, together with information as to which division they belonged to and their latest known location;

tables showing all known large units with all units organic to them, the last sector in which they were in action, their APO numbers, motor vehicle identification markings, commanders, a brief evaluation of their combat efficiency, and so forth;
tables of organization of all units, with details on their strengths and armament (tanks, armored reconnaissance cars, machine guns, mortars, AT guns, artillery, AA artillery and so forth);
a brief outline of the top-level control and command of the country involved, the types and quality of its armament and equipment, characteristics of the population and the military qualities of the average soldier;
an evaluation of the country's major units and, occasionally, of the more important commanders.

These manuals were distributed to all headquarters down to and including divisions and were maintained up-to-date by means of correction sheets. They served as a working basis in the evaluation work of the foreign intelligence branches and the intelligence officers with troops.

The pocketbooks contained all items of information on the enemy which the troops in the field needed, such as tables of organization; illustrations of uniform; tank identification charts with details as to their armor plating, guns, technical performances and the best methods of attacking them; illustrations of other arms units, their weapons and equipment and details on their performances; motor vehicle identification markings; other general information on the army in question. They were intended primarily for the intelligence officers at regiment and battalion level and for use in courses of instruction for the troops. When used as instruction material, they were supplemented by additional illustrations of uniforms and tables of organization. They were distributed down to company level.

The Rosters of Foreign Generals contained all available information on known commanders of the army concerned. A photograph of each person

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concerned was included, together with particulars on his career, former assignments, prominent characteristics and an evaluation of his abilities. The rosters completed the picture of the enemy top-level command and were distributed to all agencies of the High Command and to army groups.

The material currently prepared to assist intelligence officers in their work included tables of organization, lists of APO numbers, translations of Russian tables of authorized strengths and similar statistical material as well as evaluations of the combat efficiency of all known enemy units.

The so-called "Odd Items of the Intelligence Service" of the Western and Eastern Intelligence Branches included items of information not embodied in the situation reports and surveys but which were intended for quick dissemination to the troops in the field, or items on which amplifying reports were wanted from the troops, for instance, reports on new models of tanks, weapons and equipment, on tactical experience, fortifications, service regulations and so forth. The odd items bulletin was compiled at irregular intervals and distributed down to army level for dissemination to the units in the intelligence reports attached to operational orders.

Special studies were prepared for distribution according to the subject treated. The subjects included fortifications (for instance, data on the Maginot Line, Sevastopol, Tobruk) and included maps of the fortifications, captured service regulations, new methods of combat (such as "British Tactics" or "Russian Field Manual on Winter Warfare"), operational principles, traffic conditions, landing possibilities and

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coastal defense, landing craft, glider and parachute forces. Distribution occasionally took place down to company level. The two branches naturally also had to furnish data for conferences and briefings at all levels, thus, for instance, for the situation conferences at the Wehrmacht Operations Staff, the Commander in Chief of the Army, the Chief of the Army General Staff, the Assistant Chief of Staff IV, Intelligence - Counterintelligence conferences, and for the briefing of German and foreign attaches.

In closing this chapter, mention must be made of the commands, directives and regulations issued by the Army High Command in connection with the activities of the intelligence service. These included the "Intelligence Information Service," intended as a guide for intelligence officers with commands from corps level up in performing their mission. In addition, the branches assisted in the preparation and review of new regulations issued by other agencies.

In Appendix W, the more important types of information on the enemy have been compiled in the form of a chart together with details as to their distribution.

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CHAPTER 9

COOPERATION WITH OTHER AGENCIES

In this chapter a broad outline, without any details as to procedure, will be given of cooperation between the two intelligence branches and other important staffs and headquarters apart from the agencies previously mentioned, particularly excluding those mentioned in the enumeration of intelligence sources and agencies to which information was disseminated. A point to be borne in mind is that this cooperation with higher, parallel, and lower level agencies as well as with all nonmilitary agencies took place exclusively through the Assistant Chief of Staff IV until that office was discontinued. Only after that date was direct cooperation possible. From then on, it was left to the discretion of the branch chiefs to decide what measure of cooperation was desirable. Wherever necessary, this point will be treated in detail.

Cooperation with the agencies of the Wehrmacht and Army High Commands initially took place through the Chief of the Army General Staff and the Assistant Chief of Staff IV, through whom all inquiries in the fields handled by the intelligence branches arrived and through whom or by whose orders all enemy situation and other reports were sent out. In addition, the branch chiefs made special verbal reports to these two quarters when ordered to do so. On the whole, this system was retained without any changes for the Eastern Intelligence Branch throughout the war, as far as the Chief of the Army General Staff was concerned, even after the post

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of Assistant Chief of Staff IV was abolished, whereas the Western Intelligence Branch cooperated directly with the Wehrmacht Operations Staff in a steadily increasing measure, reporting to the Chief of the Army General Staff only at intervals on its operations. This was due to the previously mentioned fact that the Chief of the Army General Staff in practice had no influence on the theaters of operations controlled directly by the Wehrmacht Operations Staff, the so-called Wehrmacht theaters of operations.

The situation report was handed to the Commander in Chief of the Army and to the Chief of the Army General Staff at the daily situation conferences, at which time the enemy evidence reports were also submitted and a verbal report made on the latest important reports received. At these conferences, the Assistant Chief of Staff IV or the branch chiefs described the latest developments in the enemy situation and the latest evaluations. Later in the conference, the Chief of the Operations Branch, Army General Staff, gave a broad outline of enemy movements together with a description of the course of events within German units during the past twenty-four hours. This was followed by a report by the Chief, Eastern Intelligence Branch, giving details on the organization, strength and presumed intentions of the enemy, and so forth.

With the Operations Branches of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff and of the Army General Staff, cooperation naturally was particularly close. There was a constant exchange of ideas between the respective branch chiefs and frequent conferences took place between the section chiefs and specialists of the two branches on the one hand and the corresponding personnel of the two operations branches. Even closer contacts were

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maintained prior to new operations and during the decisive phases of each campaign.

A lively exchange of experiences took place with the Organization and Training Branch. The purpose was to obtain from that branch the appropriate combat reports submitted by German units and to pass on to it all information obtained on foreign developments that might be made use of in German organization and training.

The Mapping and Survey Branch furnished the two branches all German maps required and printed new maps, particularly special maps, upon request. The two branches in turn made all captured maps and military-geographical material available to the Mapping and Survey Branch for use in correcting German maps and checking, modifying and completing studies prepared on subjects of a military-geographical nature.

In like manner, information was exchanged between the two branches and the Army Chief of Transportation, who furnished the necessary information on the transportation routes available to the countries handled, together with their capacities. This information was required in calculating enemy troop concentrations and the facilities available to the enemy for the movement of reserves as well as in evaluating the enemy supply situation. In return, the Chief of Transportation received from the branches all information obtained that related to the field of transportation.

Cooperation with the Army Chief Supply and Administration Officer was concerned chiefly with the computation of captured enemy personnel and material. This information was essential in estimating the value of

enemy units, and the degree to which the enemy manpower and material potential was depleted and it had to be obtained through the Chief Supply and Administration Officer since quartermaster agencies were responsible for the movement of captured personnel and materiel. In addition, the branches received from this source information on the economic situation of the countries handled.

The National Fortifications Branch furnished all information it procured on enemy fortifications, which was particularly valuable when such installations were to be used by the German Army, as was the case with the Maginot Line, the Italian Alpine fortifications, the Sevastopol fortifications and so forth.

The Army Chief Engineer Officer furnished information similar to that furnished by the National Fortifications Branch.

The offices of the Inspector General of Panzer Troops assisted in examining and checking information on enemy armored vehicles and in preparing informational pamphlets on the best methods of combating enemy tanks. These pamphlets were issued jointly by the two branches and the Inspector General of Panzer Troops. Information of a technical nature and information derived from practical experience was also obtained from this source.

Relations with the Chief Army Signal Officer and the services he controlled have been described in Chapter 6.

Cooperation with the Army Personnel Office had to do with the appointment of intelligence officers with field commands. This matter was so vitally important to the two branches that it proved valuable for them to

have a direct influence on the appointments. In this connection it deserves mention here that the demand of the two branches that all intelligence posts with field commands at corps and division level be filled by General Staff officers, as provided for in the tables of organization, could not be met because of the lack of such officers. Except during the Polish campaign, all intelligence officers at division level and the majority at corps level were therefore officers from the field forces or officers of the reserve.

The work of the two branches in assisting in the review of regulations, pamphlets and directives issued by other branches of the Army High Command has been described elsewhere so that it need not be gone into in detail here.

Cooperation with field headquarters under the Army High Command, namely, with army groups, armies and military administration headquarters, as well as with the field forces, has been described in part in Chapter 6, SOURCES OF INFORMATION AND THEIR EVALUATION and in Chapter 8, DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION. A few further details on this subject now follow.

Generally speaking, the two branches worked directly with the intelligence officers on command staffs, who were responsible for enemy intelligence. In addition, the two branch chiefs and their operations officers and appropriate specialists conferred with the commanders in the field, their chiefs of staff, operations officers and other specialists from their operations sections. However, every effort was made to have the intelligence officer of the army group, army or other headquarters concerned participate in these conferences or at least to keep him currently

informed in order not to undermine his position within the staff and in order to promote fruitful collaboration between him and the staff of which he was a member.

With a few exceptions -- Army Group B in the West, for instance, -- counterintelligence officers had been attached to the intelligence officers of the field commands. This resulted in a division of responsibilities, the intelligence officer and his staff (staff officers, interpreters and so forth) being responsible for actual enemy intelligence while the counterintelligence officer was responsible for security within the zone of the command involved. In performing his duties, the counterintelligence officer was required to follow the instructions of the intelligence officer and to maintain such close contact with him that the counter-intelligence work, particularly the employment of agents, was adapted to the operational measures and furnished the intelligence officer the greatest possible amount of information that could be used to supplement other sources in obtaining a picture of the enemy situation.

The dissemination to lower levels of information on the enemy furnished by the two intelligence branches, particularly in the situation reports, took place primarily in broad outline in the intelligence reports included in operational orders as Item 1. To prevent the operational orders from becoming too long, the intelligence officers at field command headquarters prepared intelligence annexes and enemy evaluations; these contained all necessary details and were attached to operational orders either as annexes or as special studies. Other information furnished by the two branches was passed on either in the original text or in an abridged form.

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In this work, all the latest information available at the headquarters involved was taken into consideration and any items not of direct importance within the sector involved were excluded for security reasons.

In addition to the described duties, the intelligence officers with field commands were responsible for the morale of the troops -- a function which was transferred later to the National Socialist Guidance Officers -- for the supervision of the command post or headquarters and its activities with respect to the maintenance of security regulations, and for security against the work of foreign agents.

Contact between the two branches and the intelligence officers with field commands was maintained by means of a frequent exchange of telephone and teletype messages and personal discussions. Efforts were made to maintain as close contact as possible in order to obtain uniform concepts and to accelerate the handling of information on the enemy. The temporary detachment of officers or the more lengthy assignment of liaison officers to the combat units or to particularly critical points of the front (the East Front and the Invasion Front, for instance) insured that all important information on the enemy and all important combat experience would be forwarded for evaluation through the two branches as speedily as possible and without being watered down.

Cooperation was smooth throughout the war and was instrumental in securing a uniform presentation of the enemy picture and uniformity in the evaluation of the enemy situation at Army High Command and at the field commands.

Newly obtained information on the enemy and experience gained in

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intelligence work were constantly exchanged with the intelligence services of the other branches of the Wehrmacht, namely with the Intelligence Branch, Luftwaffe Operations Staff, and the 3d (Intelligence) Branch, Naval Operations Staff. Cooperation with the Luftwaffe and the Navy was particularly close in respect to the results obtained in ground, air and naval reconnaissance, the disposition of enemy air and naval forces, and enemy transportation and landing craft capacities. In some cases interests overlapped, as for example the antiaircraft artillery, which was controlled by the army in foreign armed forces but by the air force in Germany, also in the case of coastal defense and enemy troop convoy movements, in which both the Army and the Navy were interested. Personal discussions served to prevent any duplication of effort and to collate the separate results achieved.

As previously mentioned, cooperation with the counterintelligence service was restricted to the submission of requests for the procurement of information in any certain direction and to the recept of counter-intelligence reports. Firm measures had to be taken against certain attempts of the counterintelligence service to distribute its unchecked messages directly to various agencies of the High Command and to draw its own conclusions from such messages. This had to be prevented to avoid the presentation of a false picture to the High Command through isolated reports. In spite of all efforts, the really close and immediate contact that could only have been brought about through the appointment of a joint head of the intelligence and counterintelligence services was never achieved.

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Information was exchanged with the Foreign Intelligence Group of the Wehrmacht High Command, but this contact remained relatively unimportant.

The Wehrmacht Propaganda Branch was occasionally furnished captured documents and information obtained from experience and from an analysis of enemy reports on the morale of the countries handled. This information was used in German propaganda and in the dissemination of news.

Cooperation with the Foreign Office was originally the responsibility of the Assistant Chief of Staff IV. Later, cooperation was limited to an exchange of information, the two branches making valuable captured documents available to the Foreign Office. Thus, for instance, the captured archives of the French Ministry of War contained a wealth of important documents of a political nature, including the records of the meetings of the Supreme Allied Council of War, French agreements of a military nature with Switzerland, and records of the conference on Franco-British action in Norway.

Cooperation with other Axis and with friendly powers originally was also a specific responsibility of the Assistant Chief of Staff IV and consisted of an exchange of information on the enemy either directly or through the military attaches. On the whole, Germany was able to furnish far more intelligence material in these exchanges than it received. Generally speaking, cooperation with these countries in intelligence matters functioned smoothly, although it did become necessary to exercise a certain amount of caution and to impose restrictions because of occasional leakage to the enemy, on the information transmitted.

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Other agencies with which the two branches cooperated were not sufficiently important to be mentioned here. In Chart X the cooperation of the two branches with more important agencies is shown in a graph.

It was initially the most important function of the Assistant Chief of Staff IV to regulate the exchange of information between the two branches and to handle the compilation of the consolidated evaluations of the over-all enemy situation, but after the abolition of that post these functions were left to the discretion of the two branch chiefs. The disadvantages which resulted from this arrangement have been mentioned frequently in previous parts of this work.

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CHAPTER 10

BASIC AND ADVANCED INTELLIGENCE TRAINING

The Western and the Eastern Intelligence Branches were both equally interested in insuring that the intelligence officers with field commands and with other units, as well as the personnel in their own offices, possessed the necessary fund of knowledge to enable them to perform their functions properly and to secure smooth and successful cooperation. The quality of performances within the two branches depended largely on the reliability of the reports they received, particularly on the quality of reports coming from intelligence agencies. Generally, the intelligence officers with army groups and armies were detached for temporary service in the offices of either the Western or the Eastern Intelligence Branch in order to gain experience and to familiarize themselves on the spot with all types of information and with working methods.

The intelligence officers for corps and divisions as well as personnel to be employed within the offices or agencies of the two branches were trained in special Intelligence Service Training Courses. Initially, these courses were conducted at long intervals, but the results obtained were so excellent that they were made a permanent institution. The object was to orient officers earmarked for employment in the intelligence service on the peculiarities of the various armies and theaters of operations, the nature of the material handled, and the working methods of the intelligence service. At the same time officers already in the

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intelligence service were to be given advanced training and the latest experience was to be passed on. The instructors were officers who possessed the necessary experience in these fields and, in addition, officers of the two branches were detailed to hold lectures. The results of the courses were extremely good and served gradually to build up what might be called a cadre of intelligence officers and assistants for employment in the staffs of higher level commands.

In addition to the distribution of appropriate data, both branches at regular intervals held "Intelligence Conferences." In these conferences, the purpose of which was to familiarize intelligence personnel with the latest experience gained, officers from the two branches lectured on the results obtained through the work performed, while discussions served to remove and clarify any doubts and misunderstandings.

In like manner, "Counterintelligence Conferences" were arranged occasionally for the counterintelligence officers. These conferences were conducted in the form of instruction courses, during which the officers of the Counterintelligence Service were familiarized with the experience gathered in the two branches with respect to counterintelligence reports and with the direction in which it was desirable for them to endeavor to procure information.

Both branches were afforded the opportunity of participating in the training of candidates for the General Staff Corps. This participation took the form of lectures by the branch chiefs and suitable officers in the Kriegsakademie * on the enemy situation and on the more important

* German equivalent of the US Command and General Staff School. (Reviewer)

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foreign armies handled by their respective branches. In these lectures, the work of the Intelligence Service in determining and evaluating the enemy situation was described and the students -- the future assistants of unit commanders -- were given a survey of the activities of the Intelligence Service and of the materials with which it worked. In addition, material was furnished to the Kriegsakademie for map maneuvers and war games and "intelligence" map maneuvers were conducted by officers of the two branches.

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MS # P-041

ORGANIZATIONAL CHART
WESTERN INTELLIGENCE BRANCH
(1939-1940)

Controls:

- Chief, Army Gen Staff
  - ACofS IV (Intelligence)
    - V Intel Branch

Branch Chief
Handles: Oral SITREP to CINC/Army & Chief, Army Gen Staff; Sp Studies & Repts; Ln w/Wehrmacht Opn Staff, Navy, Luftwaffe, Army High Comd Depts, non-mil agencies

Section I Admin Off	Section II	Section III	Section IV	Section V
Branch personnel & admin	Intel on French army (w/colonies etc); Sit in France; Prep SITREP West	Army intel on Britain (w/ colonies, dominions, India, etc) & USA; Contributions to SITREP West on employment of British forces	Army intel on Italy, Spain, Portugal (w/ colonies, etc); Sit on Italian fronts & corresponding contributions to SITREP West	Army intel on Switzerland, Belgium, Holland (w/colonies, etc); Contributions to SITREP West on Belgian & Dutch fortifications & sit

Remarks: Section V discontinued after Battle of Flanders; remaining responsibilities transferred to Section II.

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MS # P-041

ORGANIZATIONAL CHART
WESTERN INTELLIGENCE BRANCH
(1941-1943)

Controls:

Chief, Army Gen Staff

ACofS IV (Intelligence)

W Intel Branch

Branch Chief
Handled: Oral SITREP to Chief, Army Gen Staff; Sp Studies; Ln w/Wehrmacht Opn Staff, Luftwaffe, Navy, Army High Comd Depts, non-mil agencies

Liaison Off w/Field Hq, Army High Comd, E Prussia

Section I
Admin Off

Branch personnel & admin

Section II

Army intel on French Vichy & Free French forces (w/colonies, etc), Free Belgium & Holland (w/colonies, etc. i.e. W & Equatorial Africa, Syria, Madagascar, Indochina

Section III

Army intel on Britain (w/colonies, dominions, India etc) & USA; Sit in Libya & Egypt; Sit in Britain

Section IV

Army intel on Italy, Spain, Switzerland, Portugal (w/colonies, etc); Sit on Italian fronts

Chart I

Remarks: Post of ACofS IV discontinued 9 Nov 42; Western Intel Branch then immediately responsible to Chief, Army Gen Staff.
Responsibility for intelligence on USA transferred from Section III to Eastern Intel Branch when USA entered the war.

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MS # P-041

ORGANIZATIONAL CHART
EASTERN INTELLIGENCE BRANCH
Spring-Autumn 1942 (After Expansion)

Controls:

Chief, Army Gen Staff

ACofS IV (Intel)

Eastern Intel Branch

AF Intel Off for ops intel on E Front; Ins mber to ACofS IV; handles: Air Sit (w/ Intel Secs, AF High Comd); Evaluation of Air Sit, air recon; Pts (w/Army Chief Fortifications Off)

Branch Chief
1 Gen Staff Off
1 Sp Staff Off

Operations Officer
(1 Gen Staff Off)
Simultaneously Dep Br Chief
Handles: German Sit; Air recon results (w/AF Intel Off); observed German & enemy sit on other fronts

Section I	Section II	Sub-Sec IIe	Section III	Section IV	Section V	Registry
Daily sit E & N. (See Sheet 2)	Over-all Russian sit. (See Sheet 3)	Russian & USA weapons; Soviet. (See Sheet 3)	Pacific & USA (see Sheet 4)	Eq Condt (see Sheet 5)	Cartographic (see Sheet 5)	See Sheet 5

Remarks:
1. Sub-Section IIe was controlled directly by the Branch Chief because of seniority of the Sub-Section Chief, not for technical reasons.
2. Owing to lack of records, minor discrepancies are possible in this chart.
3. For particulars on the various sub-sections, see Sheets 2 - 5.

Sheet 1

ORGANIZATIONAL CHART
WESTERN INTELLIGENCE BRANCH
(1943-1944)

Controls:

- Chief, Army Gen Staff
- Western Intel Branch Branch Chief
- Operations Officer

Operations Officer
Handled: Oral repts to Wehrmacht Opn Staff & Chief, Army Gen Staff; Sp Studies; Daily SITREP West; Ln w/Wehrmacht Opn Staff, Navy Luftwaffe, Army High Comd Depts, non-mil agencies; Brief evaluation enemy sit West

Ln Off w/ Field Hq, Army High Comd, East Prussia	Section I Policy Sec Branch personnel & admin.	Section II Army intel on France, Italy, Switzerland, Spain, Portugal, Belgium, Holland (w/colonies, etc.)	Section III Army intel on Britain (w/colonies, dominions, India, etc.)	Section IV Army intel on Iraq, Turkey, Afganistan, Iran, Arab countries, Slovakia, Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece; Partisans in Albania, Yugoslavia, Greece, Bulgaria.	Section V Army intel on USA, Latin America, Japan Siam, Manchuria.	Cartographic Section Cartographic work for all sections.
		Situation Sub-Sec II Current Sit Map W Mediterranean	Situation Sub-Sec III Current Sit Map Atlantic Front	Situation Sub-Sec IV Sit E Mediterranean; Partisans in Balkans	Situation Sub-Sec V Overall Naval Sit (w/ Nav Opn Staff); Far East Sit	

Remarks: SITREPS & Enemy Evaluations prep by Opn Off asstd directly by situation Sub-Secs II, III, IV, V. The country-sections handled only info on org of hostile forces in their theaters; info on the employment of enemy forces was handled by the appropriate situation sub-sections. The above chart covers the period prior to and during the opening stages of the Allied invasion.

NS # T-0/11

Specimen of the sub-division of sections in the Western Intelligence Branch

Operations Officer

Chief, Section II
(1 Gen Staff Off, 1 Clerk, 1 Orderly)
Handled: Sp studies; Oral repts to Br Chief; Contributions to SITREP & Enemy Evaluations West; survey on France; Detailed repts; Ln w/other Br secs & sub-secs, members of Army Opn Br, Luftwaffe & Navy Opn Staffs Intel Branches

Situation Sub-Sec II (2 Officers, 1 Clerk)	Sub-Sec IIa (1 Officer, 1 Clerk)	Sub-Sec IIb (1 Officer)	Sub-Sec IIc (1 Officer)	Sub-Sec IId (1 NCO)	Sub-Sec IIe (1 Officer, 1 Clerk)	Sub-Sec IIf (1 Officer, 1 Clerk)
Current Sit Rep W Mediterranean (w/Opn Off) Contributions to SITREP; Asst Br Chief & Opn Off in prep of SITREP & Enemy Evaluations.	Intel on T/Os, Motorisation, man power French, Dutch, Belgian armies; Fortifications & man power potentials of France, Holland, Belgium.	Intel on France, Belgium, Holland Disposition of forces, armament, T/Os, war potential, war industry, air & naval forces; Unit card index	Mil-political, mil-geographical intel on French, Dutch, Belgian colonies etc (particularly communications); Procurement of literature, maps, other data; Collaboration w/geographical & colonial authorities.	Card indexes on officers, list of generals, personnel statistics, uniforms, insignia of French, Dutch, Belgian armies.	Gen mil intel on Italy, Switzerland.	Gen mil intel on Spain, Portugal.

Remarks: 1. Sec II handled intel on Switzerland, France, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Belgium, Holland (including forces in various theaters); also handled situation in West Mediterranean.
2. Sub-Sections IIa & IIb were temporarily merged at times.
3. Personnel of Section II: 8 Officers, 7 NCOs, men, woman auxiliaries.

ORGANIZATIONAL CHART
WESTERN INTELLIGENCE BRANCH
(1943-1944)

Chart X

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NS # T-0411

Specimen of the sub-division of sections in the Western Intelligence Branch

Operations Officer

Chief, Section II
(1 Gen Staff Off, 1 Clerk, 1 Orderly)
Handled: Sp studies; Oral repts to Br Chief; Contributions to SITREP & Enemy Evaluations West; survey on France; Detailed repts; Ln w/other Br secs & sub-secs, members of Army Opn Br, Luftwaffe & Navy Opn Staffs Intel Branches

Situation Sub-Sec II (2 Officers, 1 Clerk)	Sub-Sec IIa (1 Officer, 1 Clerk)	Sub-Sec IIb (1 Officer)	Sub-Sec IIc (1 Officer)	Sub-Sec IId (1 NCO)	Sub-Sec IIe (1 Officer, 1 Clerk)	Sub-Sec IIf (1 Officer, 1 Clerk)
Current Sit Map W Mediterranean (w/Opn Off) Contributions to SITREP; Asst Br Chief & Opn Off in prep of SITREP & Enemy Evaluations.	Intel on T/Os, Moterisation, man power French, Dutch, Belgian armies; Fortifications & man power potentials of France, Holland, Belgium.	Intel on France, Belgium, Holland Disposition of forces, armament, T/Os, war potential, war industry, air & naval forces; Unit card index	Mil-political, mil-geographical intel on French, Dutch, Belgian colonies etc (particularly communications); Procurement of literature, maps, other data; Collaboration w/geographical & colonial authorities.	Card indexes on officers, list of generals, personnel statistics, uniforms, insignia of French, Dutch, Belgian armies.	Gen mil intel on Italy, Switzerland.	Gen mil intel on Spain, Portugal.

Remarks: 1. Sec II handled intel on Switzerland, France, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Belgium, Holland (including forces in various theaters); also handled situation in West Mediterranean.
2. Sub-Sections IIa & IIb were temporarily merged at times.
3. Personnel of Section II: 8 Officers, 7 NCOs, man, woman auxiliaries.

ORGANIZATIONAL CHART
WESTERN INTELLIGENCE BRANCH
(1943-1944)

Chart X

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MS # P-0411

Chart L

ORGANIZATIONAL CHART
WESTERN INTELLIGENCE BRANCH
SECTION III (1943-1944)

Section III
(1 Gen Staff Officer,2 Clerks, 1 Orderly)
Handles:Summaries on British Army;Contributions to evaluations of western enemy;Surveys on British Empire; Ln w/secs & sub-secs of Branch, Army Opn Br, Intel Branches of Luftwaffe & Navy Opn Staffs

Evaluation Sub-Section IIIa
(1 Gen Staff Officer,1 Clerk)

Evaluation of T/Os,cmd principles of British army;intel repts on British army; Strength,orgn,repl sit of English army;Industrial & armt potential Great Britain & N Ireland (asstd by Mil Economy & Armt Office)

Sub-Group IIIb
(1 Officer, 1 Clerk)

Intel on:British Army arms & equip (each details from Ord Off);Strength,org's repl sit of dominions;Indian,colonial etc.units, foreign contingents, Egyptian army;War industry & Armt potential of dominions etc,Egypt & India (details from Economic & Armt Office); Sit Burma & India

Sub-Group IIIc
(1 Officer,1 Clerk, 2 Interpreters)

Intel on British army top-level cmd,uniforms & insignia;Card index on British generals;Press evaluations;Crypt messages; Admin of British books & regulations.

Sub-Group IIId
(1 Official,3 Clerks)

Card index on all British units; Card index on British army officers.

Situation Sub-Section III
(2 Officers,1 Clerk)

Enemy sit W Europe,including British air & naval sit (based on repts by intel secs of Air & Naval Opn Staffs); Opn air recon missions over Britain; Direct assistance to Br Opn Off

Fortifications Sub-Group III
(1 Official,1 Clerk)

Intel on coast fortifications in Britain & Mediterranean; Military Geography of Great Britain & Ireland, British colonies,etc. and spheres of interest in Mediterranean (details from Map & Survey Branch)

Mission of Section III: Army intel on British army,including foreign contingents; Sit Atlantic Front.
Remarks: British-troops from entire British Empire; English Army - units from Great Britain & N Ireland.
Foreign contingents included, for example, Polish units with British Army.
Total personnel in section: 6 officers, 2 officials, 13 enlisted men, woman clerk auxiliaries.

MS # P-041 1

ORGANIZATIONAL CHART
EASTERN INTELLIGENCE BRANCH
(1941 - Spring 1942)



Remarks: This table has been prepared from memory alone. Minor discrepancies are possible.

Evaluation Sub-Section IIa was created by order of the Chief, Army General Staff and assumed the responsibilities of the Situation Sub-Section in April 1942.

Chart M

EASTERN INTELLIGENCE BRANCH

Section I
Daily Situation East & North
(1 Gen Staff Off as Sec Chief)

Sub-Section I S
Army Group South
(1 Gen Staff Off
1-2 Sp Staff Off)

Sub-Section I M
Army Group Center
(1 Gen Staff Off
1 Sp Staff Off)

Sub-Section I N
Army Group North
(1 Gen Staff Off
1 Sp Staff Off)

Daily Situation Reports; Drafts of enemy estimates; Identification of enemy units; Data for card indexes maintained by Sub-Section IIc; Estimates of combat strengths; Daily map of reconnaissance results; Maintenance of situation maps, special maps & maps showing disposition of forces; Daily changes in enemy situation & strength ratios; Data on PWs & captured materiel (based on reports from field unit intelligence officers); Enemy artillery situation; Compilation of statistical data for Section II.

For controls see Chart N, Sheet 1.

EASTERN INTELLIGENCE BRANCH

For controls see Chart N, Sheet 1

Section II
Russia: Over-all Situation
1 Gen Staff Off as Sec Chief

Sub-Section IIa	Sub-Section IIb	Sub-Section IIc	Sub-Section IId	Sub-Section IIe
Intel procur & evaluation (1 Gen Staff, 1 Sp Staff Officer)	Special Studies (1 Officer)	Card Indexes (2 Officers)	Sp Assignments (1 Officer, 1 Official)	Enemy weapons technology (w/ Ord Off) Intel on Swedish army; Sp assignments under instructions from Br Chief
Processing of radio & press repts, sig intel results, intercept diplomatic messages, PW statements, captured documents, intel repts from field comds; Compilations for Chief, Army Gen Staff & Br Chief; Ln w/Counterintel Office, Wehrmacht High Comd Propaganda Br; Control of PW interrogation & Document Collecting Center (1 Officer)	Studies for Br & Sec Chief; Food sit (w/ Wehrmacht Economic Br, Chief of Sup & Admin, Reich Minister for Occupied E Territories); Processing of intercept crypt messages	Indexes of T/Os, units, actual strengths, personnel, repl matters	Economic & Armament Sit (w/ Wehrmacht Economic & Armament Office); Imports (w/ Chief Trans Off in traffic affairs, Chief Map & Surv Br in mil-geographic & mapping subjects, Chief of Chemical Units in gas problems)	Sub-Section IIe was controlled directly by the Branch Chief because of the seniority of the Sub-Section Chief

Chart N
Sheet 3

EASTERN INTELLIGENCE BRANCH



For controls see Chart H, Sheet 1

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Chart K
Sheet 5

MATERIEL INTELLIGENCE BRANCH

Section IV Special Assignments Hq Commandant (1 Officer)	Section V Cartographic Office (1 Official)	Registry (1 Official)
Special assignments from Br Chief; Branch personnel & supplies admin.	Distribution of cartographic work; Assignment of cartographers & draftsmen; Reproductions.	Supervision of office routine; Records.

EASTERN INTELLIGENCE BRANCH
(after further expansion in October 1942 to end of war)

Controls:

Chief, Army Gen Staff

Eastern Intel Branch

Branch Chief
(1 Gen Staff, 1 Sp Staff Off)

Asg AF Intel Off, tne mber to Chief, Army Gen Staff: Repts on air sit; Air Recon; Info on Russian AF & fortifications (w/ Chief Eng Off). Ln w/Intel Secs, CINC,AF

Operations Officer
(1 Gen Staff Off, simultaneously Branch Chief)
Handled: German Sit, Interpretation Air Recon Results(w/AF Intel Secs); German & Enemy Sit in other theaters

Section I	Section II	Section III	Section IV	Section V	Registry	Section VI
Sit E & N	Over-all mil sit Russia	Southeast	N States	Carto-graphic & Reproduc-tion Offices	Pers files; Registra-tion	Hq Comdt & Sp Asg
see Sheet 2	see Sheet 3	see Sheet 4	see Sheet 5	see Sheet 5	see Sheet 5	see Sheet 5

Remarks:
1. Presumably in 1943, Section III (Southeast) was transferred to W Intel Br.
2. In the course of a later reorganization, all work concerned with the procurement of information was transferred from Section II to a newly formed Section III, organized as follows: Sub-Sec IIIa, captured printed material, reports, orders, books; Sub-Sec IIIb, captured written papers, APO mail; Sub-Sec IIIc, PW statements; Sub-Sec IIId, radio intercept; Sub-Sec III-Propaganda, enemy propaganda, newspapers, crypt messages.
3. Owing to lack of data, minor inaccuracies are possible in this chart.

Chart to Sheet 1

EASTERN INTELLIGENCE BRANCH

Section I
Situation East & North
(1 Gen Staff, 1 Sp Staff Off)

Sub-Section Army Gp A	Sub-Section Army Gp South	Sub-Section Army Gp Center	Sub-Section Army Gp North
(4 General Staff Officers, 6 other officers)			
Daily situation report; Draft of enemy evaluation; Identification of enemy units; Data for Sub-Sec IIc; Evaluation of combat strengths; Daily signal intelligence results; Enemy situation maps; Special maps; Air reconnaissance maps; Disposition-of-enemy-forces maps; Enemy-troops-concentrations maps; Sections of enemy situation maps; Daily changes in strength ratios; Compilation of PWs & material captured (based on reports from field units' intelligence sections); Artillery situation; compilation of daily data for statistical evaluation by Section II.			

Partisan
Sub-Section
(1 Gen Staff, 1 other off)

Partisan sit in army gp zones; Partisan attacks, action against railroads, propaganda & espionage; Partisan units identification; Card index; Evaluations; Enemy tactics combat performances, condition of partisan units; Ammo & food supplies of Partisans; Analysis of enemy methods for use in organization of counteraction.

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Chart C Sheet 2

EASTERN INTELLIGENCE BRANCH

Section II
Russia: Over-all Mil Sit
(1 Gen Staff Officer)

Sub-Sec IIa	Sub-Sec IIb	Sub-Sec IIc	Sub-Sec IId	Sub-Sec IIe	Sub-Sec IIs
Enemy intentions; Disp of strat res; Manpower; Repl orgn; Trng status; Top level comd; Evaluation of CI repts; Ln w/CI Off; Sp assgs.	Evaluation of IPW results & distr of excerpts; Use of press & intercept messages; Army affairs & propaganda (w/ Army Affairs Br & Wehrmacht Propaganda Off); Food sit (w/ Wehrmacht Economics Off, Chief, Sup & Admin & Minister for Occupied E Territories); Caucasus; Russian forces in Iran (w/Sub-Sec III); Foreign units in Russia.	Unit & sp card indexes; Daily computation enemy strengths & strength ratios w graphs; T/Os, repl units, schools, pers affairs.	Sp subjects; Economy & Armament sit (w/ Wehrmacht Economics & Armt Office); Imports; Enemy weapons developments (w/ Ord Off); Ln w/Chief of Trans, Chief of Map & Survey, Chief of Sup & Admin -- concerning med & vet affairs --, Chief of Chemical Troops -- concerning gas affairs.	Evaluation of intel Bulletins from German field units; Consolidation repts from Intel Service East; Opn doctrines; Trng directives (w/Opn & Trng Brs & Chiefs of Arms & Services); Soviet Mil Areas.	Interpretation captured documents & IPW results (2 interpreters); Translation of captured documents & correspondence (5 interpreters); Translation of books & regulations, compilation of book catalogue (3 interpreters); Detachments to Army Gps for screening of captured documents etc.
1 Gen Staff, 1 other Off.	3 Officers	2 Officers, 1 Official	2 Officers	1 Gen Staff Officer	1 Gen Staff, 1 other officer, 10 Interpreters

See remark 2 on Sheet 1.

Chart C Sheet 2

EASTERN INTELLIGENCE BRANCH



Presumably in 1943, Section III (Southeast) was transferred to the Western Intelligence Branch.

EASTERN INTELLIGENCE BRANCH

Section IV North States (2 officers)	Section V Cartographic & Reproduction Offices (1 Official as Section Chief)		Registry (2 Officials)	Section VI Hq Comdt & Sp Asgs (2 Officers)
Politico-mil surveys of entire area. Swedish Army: Comd. org. trng. T/Os. card indexes; arms & equip. fortifications. Finnish Army: Peacetime org. pers statistics.	Sub-Sec Va Cartographic Center (2 Officials) Distr of asgs; Asg of cartographers & draftsmen; Map center; Book binding	Sub-Sec Vb Heliprint & Photography Center (2 Officials) Reproductions. photostats. heliprints.	Personnel files; Registration.	Sp asgs from Br Chief; Supervision of office routine; Officer pers affairs; Office premises.

Policy Group
(1 Gen Staff & 1 other Officer, 1 NCO, 2 Men)

Sub-Section I 1 Gen Staff, other officer Turkey, Irak, Afganistan & Arab Countries	Sub-Section Ia (1 Officer, 1 Official) Turkey, Iran, Afganistan	Sub-Section Ib (2 Officers, 2 Officials) Arab Countries (Syria, Irak, Palastine, Transjordan, Saudi-Arabia)	Sub-Section II (2 Officers, 1 Official) SE Europe (Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, Croatia, Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece)	Sub-Section III (1 Official) All SE countries	Registry (1 NCO)
Enemy sit maps; Disposition of forces, troop movements; Strength, org, arms, equip, trng; Mobilization; Distribution of British & Russian forces in Near East (w/W & E Intel Brs); Naval & air forces; Mil leaders. Ln w/AF & Navy Intel Secs.	a. Domestic & man power sit; comm & Trans sit; Mil-geography; b. Mil installations; Press; Political Leaders; c. Food & Economic sit including imports in all Near East countries; d. Interpreter problems; Ln w/Chief of Trans, Chief of Sup & Admin; Wehrmacht High Comd PW Branch & Economics Br.	Same as Sub-Sec Ia, excluding Items c & d; Near East fortifications; Ln w/Chief Eng Off & AF Opn Staff intel sections.	Mil & politico-mil sit; Strength, orgn & employment of armies; Economical sit; Press reports.	Mapping; Proc & correction of maps; Interpretation of terrain intel reports. Asg of cartographic work; Asg of cartographers & draftsmen; Reproductions; Map Center; Ln w/Map & Surv Br.	Supervision of office routine; Enlisted personnel files; Registry.
Additional Personnel: 4 men	2 NCOs 2 Men	2 Men	2 Men	1 NCO, 1 Man, as Cartographers: 1 Official, 1 NCO, 2 Men.	2 Men

MS # P-041i
Map-Chart R
Scale 1: 25 000 000

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Delimitation of Theaters of War (Excl. Far East + Sections of Near East) of the Western + Eastern Intelligence Branches. (1943 - 1944)

Remark: In its Situation Sub. Sec. V, the Western Intelligence Branch also handled the Far East and the naval Situation on all oceans

AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY OF THE EASTERN INTELLIGENCE BRANCH

SUB-SEC A GP NORTH

SUB SEC A GP CENTER

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

SUB SEC A GP SOUTH

SUB SEC A GP A

Norway

Sweden

Finland

Esthonia

Latvia

Lithuania

Poland

Ireland

England

Holland

Belgium

Germany

Czecho-Slovakia

Slovakia

Hungary

Romania

Yugoslavia

Bulgary

Albania

Turkey

Syria

Irak

Egypt

Libya

Tunesia

Algier

Morocco

Spain

Portugal

France

Switzerland

Austria

Italy

INVASION FRONT SITUATION SUB SEC III

AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY OF THE WESTERN INTELLIGEN BRANCH

WEST MEDITERRANEAN SITUATION SUB SEC II

EAST MEDITERRANEAN SITUATION SUB SEC IV

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MS # P-041
Map-Chart Q

Western + Eastern Intelligence Branches
Areas of Responsibility 1943-1944



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Chart 8

TABLE OF COUNTRIES AND THEATERS HANDLED BY THE WESTERN AND EASTERN INTELLIGENCE BRANCHES IN 1943

I. COUNTRIES

	Responsible Section	Remarks
1. West. Int. Br.		
Britain w Dominions, Colonies, etc.	III	
France w Colonies, etc.	II	Sub-Divided Vichy & Free France
Belgium & Belgian Congo	II	Free Belgium after 1940 Campaign in the West
Holland w Colonies, etc.	II	
Switzerland	II	
Iberian Peninsula		
a. Spain w Colonies,	II	
b. Portugal etc.	II	
USA	V	Temporarily handled by Eastern Intel Br
Central & South America	V	
Far East:		
China	V	Originally handled by Eastern Intel Br
Japan	V	
Siam	V	
Arab Countries		
Syria, Irak, Palestine, Trans-Jordan., Saudi-Arab.	IV	Originally handled by Eastern Intel Br, temporarily by SE Intel Sec
Turkey	IV	
Iran	IV	
Afghanistan	IV	
Southeastern Europe		
Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, Croatia, Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece	IV	
2. Eastern Intelligence Branch		
Union of Soviet Soc Republics	II	
Northern Countries		
Sweden	IV	
Finland	IV	

II. THEATERS OF OPERATIONS

Designation	Responsible Section
Atlantic Front, incl possible Anglo-American landings in Norway & Denmark; incl bases on Spitsbergen, Iceland & Greenland	Situation Sub-Sec III
Mediterranean Area	
West. Mediterranean, to a line from Trieste - Straits of Otranto - western border of Lybia	Situation Sub-Sec II
East. Mediterranean, east of the above line	Situation Sub-Sec IV
African Area	Situation Sub-Sec II
Balkans	Situation Sub-Sec IV
Far East Theater, incl India & Pacific	Situation Sub-Sec V
Naval Situation of all western opponents in all oceans, incl convoys to Murmansk	Situation Sub-Sec V
Eastern Front	Situation Sub-Sec I
Northern Front	Situation Sub-Sec I

MS # P-041i

Chart 2
Sheet 1

WESTERN & EASTERN INTELLIGENCE BRANCHES
Intelligence Sources During War

Sources	Type of Information	Info used chiefly for
1. Field Forces		
Army Gps & Armies	Open Repts; Intel Repts; Evaluations of enemy sit	SITREPS; Surveys; Enemy sit evaluations
IPW teams w/ Divs & Corps	PW & deserter statements	SITREPS; T/Os; Surveys
Divisions & Corps	Captured regulations & other documents	According to contents
Divisions & Corps	Info on captured wpns & equip	Publication in "Odd Items of Intel Serv"
Army Gps & Armies	Reports on experience gained	Special studies, manuals
2. Agencies of Army High Cond		
Opn Branch	Command reports	SITREPS
Attache Br	Attache reports	Enemy sit evaluations, manuals
Chief Sig Officer	Sig intel info; Miscellaneous repts	SITREPS; Surveys; Enemy sit evaluations
Orgn & Trng Branches	Experience repts	Manuals, special studies
Ord Office	Solicited repts	In "Odd Items of Intel Service"

Chart I
Sheet 2

WESTERN & EASTERN INTELLIGENCE BRANCHES
Intelligence Sources During War

Sources	Type of information	Info used chiefly for
3. Wehrmacht High Comd Agencies		
OI Office	OI reports	According to contents
Foreign Op	Politico-mil surveys; Foreign press digests	Enemy situation evaluations
Crypt Sec	Intcp crypt & other messages	Enemy situation evaluations
Mil economy & Armt Off	Data on enemy armt potential	Enemy situation evaluations, manuals
German Armistice Com	Repts on French Army	Survey of France
4. Navy, Air Forces		
Intel Secs AF Opn Staff	Data on enemy air forces; Air SITREPS; Air recon results	SITREPS; Enemy situation evaluations
Intel Secs Naval Opn Staff	Data on enemy naval forces; Recon results	SITREPS; Enemy situation evaluations

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Chart T
Sheet 3

WESTERN & EASTERN INTELLIGENCE BRANCHES
Intelligence Sources During War

Sources	Type of information	Info used chiefly for
5. Non-mil Sources		
Foreign Off; Air Ministry Research Off; Security Serv of SS *	Miscellaneous reports, usually of politico-mil nature	Enemy situation evaluations
Minister for E Occupied Territories; E Affairs Institute; Industrial Circles	Statistical data on Russia	Only for statistical studies by Eastern Intel Branch
6. Radio & Press	Digests by research sections of both intel branches	Evaluation of enemy situation
7. Allies & Friendly Neutrals	Miscellaneous reports & data	According to contents

* More commonly known as Sicherheitsdienst or SD (Reviewer).

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EASTERN INTELLIGENCE BRANCH (1942-1943)
Normal Daily Routine

CHART U

Time	Activities				Sub - Section					
	Branch Chief	Operations Officer	Section I (Daily Enemy Situation)	Section II Section Chief	IIa	IIb	IIc	IId	IIe	Section V
0500-0700		Rec daily opn repts from Opn Br & obtained opn morning reports	Rec M/R (Intel) — (night events, possibly night repts on previous day) from intel secs of army gps & armies by teletype & telephone; Changes to sit maps & enemy dispositions							
0800-0930	SITREP by Opn Off on M/R & day repts from Opn Br; Rept by Chief, Sec I or sit experts on M/R (Intel). Daily opn instructions; Rept to ACOFS IV on Sit.	Rept to Br Chief; Morning mail rec & distr (important items to Br Chief, other to appropriate sections or experts)	Rep to Br Chief on M/R changes in sit; compilation of ident units for card index (IIc) & of enemy strengths accrding to repts from divs, corps, armies (based on IPW results, enemy losses, sig intel, captured documents, experience); Results forwarded to Sub-Sec IIc; Strength Charts & Distr-of-Forces Maps posted	Morning mail rec & distr to experts; Instructions to experts; Consultation w/Wehrmacht Press & CI Offices, Army Trng Br, Chief of Sup & Admin	Processing of Press, Radio Air Recon, Intcp Serv Repts, IPW results, captured documents, enemy sit repts by field comds; Important excerpts for use by Br Chief in repts to Chief, Army Gen Staff & by Sub-Secs IIb, IIc, IId. Stat data for Chief, Army Gen Staff, such as diagrams of Russian combat strength, orgn of strat res, rehab of units; strength ratios in specific sectors	Processing of info on Russian food sit (asstd by Wehrmacht Economic Off, Chief of Sup & Admin, Minister for Occupied E Territories); captured documents, press, radio, attache, CI repts on Russian food & agricultural sit	Card indexes: 1. Enemy units from regt up; 2. Distr of forces (front, rear zone, ZI); 3. Strength computations according to combat value (w/Sec I sit experts); 4. Repl. Army; 5. New activated units; 6. Schools; 7. Commanders (colonels & generals;) 8. APO numbers	Processing of Russian economic & armt sit (excl food & agriculture); Ident & registration of armt & other factories w/ capacities, on basis captured documents, press, radio CI repts, IPW info, info from E Affairs Institute, Koenigsberg, German industrial circles, Wehrmacht Economic & Armt Office	Russian weapons: Collection, compilation & processing of captured documents, IPW info, press, radio attache, CI reports & data from German armt industry	Cartographic asgs; Statistics; Diagrams; Sit & sp maps; Reproductions; Helioprints; Photostats of drafts for daily sit maps
0930-1000	Rept to Chief, Army Gen Staff	Orientation of Sec I on German sit according to sit map by Opn Br	Telephone info on sit from intel secs of army gps & armies (during major battles also from main-point-of-effort corps). Sit map posted							
1015-1200	Important mail read; Rept from Opn Off & Sec chiefs on other mail. Rept by sec chiefs or Opn Off on enemy sit; Submission by Chief Sec II of studies for Chief, Army Gen Staff	Deputize for Branch Chief in routine matters; Evaluation of air recon results & posting of special maps	Compilation of data (IPW results, special reports from intel agencies & enemy info bulletins of army gps, armies, etc., ident units etc) for use by Sec II	Rept to Branch Chief; Submission of studies for Chief, Army Gen Staff; Sit conference w/all sec experts on basis of repts on German & enemy sit	Situation conference Rec attache, CI & Intcp Serv repts & posting of sp maps	Situation conference Compilation of intcp crypt messages, for Br Chief, Chief of Army Gen Staff & Opn Branch	Situation conference Russian T/Os on basis of captured T/Os; Semi-monthly circulars for intel officers w/troops;	Situation conference Imports, particularly from USA according to press, radio, CI, attache reports, IPW results; Russian comm system (asst by Chief of Army Trans); Captured maps & mil-geographic data (asst by Map & Survey Br); Gas warfare problems (w/Chief of Chemical Units) Studies for Br Chief, Chief of Army Gen Staff, Wehrmacht Opn Staff (e.g., studies on Russian tank production)	Situation conference Contributions for studies & particularly for "Odd Items of Intel Service" (w/ illustrations)	
1230-1500 (some days to 1700)	Attend Chief, Army Gen Staff rept at Hitler's Hq		Constant contact w/experts of Opn Secs of Opn Branch	Translation captured documents; Sp asgs for Chief, Army Gen Staff, such as computation of Russian mil man power potential (asstd by Chief of Sup & Admin, E Affairs Institute, Minister for E Occupied Territories, Army Orgn Br, Ministry for Armt & War Production). Prep work on orientation manuals & addenda to intel data on Russia; IPW results; Over-all evaluations; Rec sig recon SITREP; Compilation of info from CI rept for Br Chief, Chief of Army Gen Staff, Opn Br; Sp asgs for Chief of Army Gen Staff; Computation of enemy strength (asstd by sit experts & Sub-Sec IIc; Oral rept by Sub-Sec IIa.)	Evaluation of repl & sup trans, rail trans & foreign deliveries; computation of enemy strengths in specific sectors; Compilations for use by Br Chief in repts to Chief of Army Gen Staff or Wehrmacht Opn Staff		Entries in card indexes on basis of evening repts & sig intel repts (asstd by Section I); Special computations (w/Sub-Sec IIa) for Br Chief & Chief of Army Gen Staff			
1500-1700	Rept by Chief, Sec II on sec work, if necessary asstd by sec experts	Discussions w/ AF intel secs	Telephone info from army group and army intel sections on sit							
to 1900	SITCONF w/Opn Off, Sec I & Chief of Sec II; Instr for prep of sit evaluation & SITREP	SITCONF with Branch Chief	Telephone or teletype enemy evaluations from armies & army groups; Post sit maps; SITCONF with Branch Chief							
2000	Repts by Opn Off & sit experts	Orientation at Opn Br concerning interim opn repts	Sig Intel SITREP rec & evaluation; Rec army gp & army evening repts. Telephone rept to Branch Chief							
from 2100	Rept to Chief of Army Gen Staff. Submission of final version Enemy SITREP & evaluation	Rec Enemy SITREP from Sub-Sec II experts; Rept to Branch Chief.	Processing of Enemy SITREP & evaluation; Prep of enemy sit maps (scale 1:1 000 000 & 1: 300 000) & chart showing distr enemy forces; Collation of enemy strengths w/Sig Intel SITREP & card index data of Sub-Sec IIc.							
until 0300 next morning	Rept by Chief, Sec II on evaluation intel of info									

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Chart W
Sheet 1

THE MORE IMPORTANT INTELLIGENCE DOCUMENTS DISTRIBUTED BY THE WESTERN & EASTERN INTELLIGENCE BRANCHES

Type	Chief contents	Published	Distribution
SITREPS West & East	Info on enemy sit, ident units, orgn & chain of comd, etc.	(Daily, when necessary, twice daily)	From army level up
Sit maps & sketches	Graphic presentation of enemy sit	As above	As above
Brief appreciation of enemy sit West & East	Latest info on enemy operations	Usually daily	Army gps & more important Army & Wehrmacht High Comd agencies
Over-all appreciation of enemy sit	Complete picture of possible enemy action	As required	Usually only to Wehrmacht High Comd, Chief, Army Gen Staff, AF & Navy Opn Staffs
Surveys on France, USA, Britain, etc.	Primarily statistical information	At long intervals or as required	All levels down to army
Miscellaneous studies	According to subjects & available data	As required	Usually only Wehrmacht High Comd, Chief, Army Gen Staff, Army Opn Br
Wartime Armies Manual	Stat data for field unit intel officers	According to material accumulated	From division up
Pocket books	Stat data for field unit intel officers at regt & bn level & for use in training troops	According to material accumulated	From company level up

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Chart V
Sheet 2

THE MORE IMPORTANT INTELLIGENCE DOCUMENTS DISTRIBUTED BY THE WESTERN & EASTERN INTELLIGENCE BRANCHES

Type	Chief contents	Published	Distribution
Rosters of general off	Data on enemy commanders	As required	From army gp level up
Miscellaneous Intelligence Bulletins	T/Os, APO numbers, strength repts, etc.	As required	Intel secs down to division level
Odd Items of Intel Bulletin	Tac & tech data in detail; Requests for info from troops	As required	All agencies down to army level
Special Publications	Data on fortifications engineering etc.	As required	According to contents

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Chart X
Sheet 1

IMPORTANT OFFICES WITH WHICH THE WESTERN AND EASTERN INTELLIGENCE BRANCHES COOPERATED

Designation of Office	Info the Western & Eastern Intel Branches Furnished	Received
1. Superior Hq Wehrmacht High Comd & Opn Staff; CINC/Army; Chief, Army Gen Staff; ACOS IV	Presentation of enemy sit; all types data on enemy; replies to inquiries on intel subjects	Info on measures & intentions of German Comd as guide in evaluating enemy situation
2. AF & Navy AF Opn Staff Intel Secs	Exchange of experience & info on the enemy.	Info on enemy air & AAA forces
Navy Opn Staff 1st & 3d Br	Exchange of experience & recon results.	Info on enemy navies & mercantile shipping, landing craft capacities, convoy movements, coast defenses
3. Miscellaneous CI Office	Instructions as to info required	Intel info
Wehrmacht Foreign Group	Exchange of politico-military data	
Wehrmacht Propaganda Br	Captured documents & info on morale in enemy countries	
Foreign Office	Captured documents w/political contents. Exchange of information of a political nature	
4. Axis Countries & Friendly Neutrals	Exchange of info on enemy & miscellaneous reports	

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Chart X
Sheet 2

IMPORTANT OFFICES WITH WHICH THE WESTERN AND EASTERN INTELLIGENCE BRANCHES COOPERATED

Designation of Office	Info the Western & Eastern Intel Branches Furnished	Received
5. Hq at Parallel Level		
Opn Br, Wehrmacht Opn Staff; Opn Br, Army Gen Staff	Info on enemy sit constantly exchanged	Info on German plans as guide for intel efforts;
Orgn & Trng Brs, Army Gen Staff	Exchange of experience gained by troops	Data on trng & org of foreign armies for use in German army
Map & Surv Br, Army Gen Staff	Requests for maps; Printing of sp & other maps requested	Cartographic & milgeographic data
Chief Trans Off	Data on comm facilities & capacities in foreign countries	Info on enemy trans affairs
Chief of Sup & Admin		Info on PWs & captured materiel; Mil economic data
Fortifications Branch Chief Eng Off	Data on enemy fortifications	Techn data on fortifications
IG Panzer Forces	Contributions for bulletins on AT action	Tac & techn experience in tank combat
Chief Army Sig Officer	Directives & suggestions for Sig Intel Serv	Sig recon results
Pers Office	Desires for appointments to higher level intel posts	

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Chart X
Sheet 3

IMPORTANT OFFICES WITH WHICH THE WESTERN AND EASTERN INTELLIGENCE BRANCHES COOPERATED

Designation of Office	Info the Western & Eastern Intel Branches Furnished	Received
6. Subordinate Hq Army Gps, armies, Mil Admin Hq, Troop Units	Data on enemy	All info received on enemy